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FORESEEABILITY AND COPYRIGHT INCENTIVES
Shyamkrishna Balganesh∗
Copyright law’s principal justification today is the economic theory of creator incentives.
Central to this theory is the recognition that while copyright’s exclusive rights framework
provides creators with an economic incentive to create, it also entails large social costs, and
that creators therefore need to be given just enough incentive to create in order to balance
the system’s benefits against its costs. Yet, none of copyright’s current doctrines enable courts
to circumscribe a creator’s entitlement by reference to limitations inherent in the very idea of
incentives. While the common law too relies on providing actors with incentives to behave
in certain ways, it recognizes that its incentive structure has outer limits and that failing to
calibrate an entitlement or liability with these limits in mind is likely to prove inefficient.
The principal mechanism that it employs to this end is the concept of foreseeability.
Premised on the idea that individuals do not ordinarily consider consequences that are
temporally or causally far removed from their actions, foreseeability allows courts to balance
a regime’s ex ante incentive effects against its ex post costs when determining liability.
This Article argues that if copyright law is to remain true to its theory of incentives, and
thereby the need to balance monopoly control with the social costs that are central to the
theory, it needs to internalize the idea that creators, like actors elsewhere, are incapable of
fully anticipating all future contingencies associated with their actions, which in turn limits
the effectiveness of incentives. To this end, this Article proposes a test of “foreseeable
copying” to limit copyright’s grant of exclusivity to situations where a copier’s use was
reasonably foreseeable at the time of creation — the point when the incentive is meant to
operate. Adopting a test of foreseeability is thus likely to better align copyright law with its
underlying purpose and provide courts with a mechanism by which to give effect to
copyright’s theory of incentives in individual cases — thereby according the theory more
than just rhetorical significance.

–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
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I. INTRODUCTION

A

s an instrumentally driven entitlement, copyright has its limits. If,
as most agree, copyright law’s primary purpose lies in providing
individuals with an incentive to generate creative expression, its grant
of exclusivity must be limited by that purpose.1 Yet, courts almost
never look to copyright’s incentive structure in delineating its scope.
They routinely assume that its property-like nature automatically entitles its holder to internalize all possible benefits associated with the
work — whether or not the creator was responsible for them beyond
just creating the work. This issue becomes most pressing in cases involving markets for new uses — uses that either employ the work in
the context of a new technology or creatively employ the work for an
altogether new purpose.2
An overwhelmingly large number of copyright cases, both historically and in the recent past, have involved markets for new uses —
most prominently, uses involving new technologies.3 The printing
press, photocopiers, cable retransmission, audio and video recorders,
digital conversion, and filesharing, to name a few, each presented
copyright law with essentially the same question: do a copyright
owner’s exclusive rights in a work extend to its use with a new technology that was not in existence when the work was created? A
somewhat similar issue often arises in relation to derivative works,
where an existent work is modified to create an altogether new one.4
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––

1 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (authorizing Congress “To promote the Progress of Science
and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to
their respective Writings and Discoveries”); Neil Weinstock Netanel, Copyright and a Democratic
Civil Society, 106 YALE L.J. 283, 285 (1996) (“To encourage authors to create and disseminate
original expression, copyright law accords them a bundle of proprietary rights in their works.”).
2 For a discussion of new uses in the context of new technologies, see Jane C. Ginsburg, Copyright and Control over New Technologies of Dissemination, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1613 (2001).
3 See, e.g., BENJAMIN KAPLAN, AN UNHURRIED VIEW OF COPYRIGHT 101–25 (1967)
(discussing the evolution of copyright in light of contemporary and future technologies); MARK
ROSE, AUTHORS AND OWNERS: THE INVENTION OF COPYRIGHT 3–5 (1993) (discussing the
emergence of copyright in the era of the printing press). Many prominent cases have faced the
question of markets for new uses. See, e.g., Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464
U.S. 417 (1984) (dealing with the video recorder); Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Television,
Inc., 392 U.S. 390 (1968) (dealing with cable retransmissions); White-Smith Music Publ’g Co. v.
Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1 (1908) (dealing with the market for piano rolls); Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp.,
336 F.3d 811 (9th Cir. 2003) (dealing with the market for thumbnails of copyrighted photographs);
Ty, Inc. v. Publ’ns Int’l Ltd., 292 F.3d 512 (7th Cir. 2002) (dealing with the photographic cataloging of plush toys); UMG Recordings, Inc. v. MP3.Com, Inc., 92 F. Supp. 2d 349 (S.D.N.Y. 2000)
(dealing with the market for digital music). Perhaps the best known cases in the recent past include those filed against Google. See Complaint, McGraw-Hill Co. v. Google Inc., No. 05 CV
8881 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 19, 2005); Complaint, Author’s Guild v. Google Inc., No. 05 CV 8136
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 20, 2005). These two cases have been combined for the purposes of a provisional
settlement agreement. Settlement Agreement, Author’s Guild, No. 05 CV 8136-JES (Oct. 28,
2008), http://www.googlebooksettlement.com/Settlement-Agreement.pdf.
4 See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006) (defining a “derivative work”).
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On most occasions, courts answer this question in the affirmative, effectively allowing copyright holders to control the development and direction of the new use and thereby the market for it. Occasionally
though, they have refused to do so, preferring to draw a limit to copyright’s exclusivity and recognizing that a creator’s entitlement does not
extend to the new use.5 Yet in doing so, they have struggled to articulate a coherent, forward-looking principle on which to justify the
refusal.6
Of the various theories commonly advanced to justify copyright
law, the utilitarian incentive-based one continues to dominate among
scholars, judges, and policymakers.7 In this view, copyright exists
primarily (if not entirely) to provide creators with an incentive to produce creative expression through the promise of limited exclusionary
control over their creative work. Creators are presumed to be rational
utility maximizers and therefore capable of being induced to create by
the prospect of controlling a future market for their yet-to-be-created
works. For all its reliance on the idea of creator incentives, though,
copyright law does very little to instantiate the idea of incentives into
its entitlement delineation process. None of copyright’s current doctrinal devices enable courts to circumscribe a creator’s entitlement by
reference to the incentive structure on which the institution is premised. As a direct consequence, creators (and their assignees) are often
thought to be rightfully entitled to any revenue stream associated with
their creation, whether or not that stream owes its existence solely to
the creator and regardless of it having been developed well after the
creation of the work.
Interestingly, though, the common law has come to recognize that
there are limits to human predictive capacities that in turn impact the
extent to which incentives and deterrents influence individual behavior. And as a consequence, the common law allows its liability and entitlement calculations to be shaped by this recognition. Its principal
device to this end is the concept of foreseeability.8 In its simplest formulation, foreseeability restricts a party’s recovery by limiting either a
plaintiff’s entitlement or a defendant’s liability to events and conse–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
5 See Teleprompter Corp. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 415 U.S. 394 (1974); Fortnightly
Corp., 392 U.S. 390; RIAA v. Diamond Multimedia Sys. Inc., 180 F.3d 1072 (9th Cir. 1999).
6 See Ginsburg, supra note 2, at 1619–26 (noting courts’ inconsistency in articulating a basis
for these decisions).
7 See infra section II.A, pp. 1577–81.
8 The most prominent use of foreseeability has of course been in tort law. See KENNETH S.
ABRAHAM, THE FORMS AND FUNCTIONS OF TORT LAW 125 (3d ed. 2007); 3 FOWLER V.
HARPER ET AL., THE LAW OF TORTS § 16.9, at 467 (2d ed. 1986); Leon Green, Foreseeability in
Negligence Law, 61 COLUM. L. REV. 1401 (1961). For an analysis of its use in other contexts, see
infra sections III.A.2–5, pp. 1597–1600.
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quences that were objectively capable of being anticipated at a certain
point in time.
In each of the contexts where the common law employs foreseeability as a limiting device, its basis for doing so remains somewhat similar. As a process, the common law is both backward- and forwardlooking. On the one hand, it allocates the costs arising from a certain
event between the litigating parties, but on the other hand, it simultaneously attempts to induce future parties to behave in certain ways in
order to avoid those costs and at times obtain benefits.9 In this latter
guidance function, the common law looks to how individuals behave
in different contexts and formulates a set of incentives (entitlements)
and deterrents (liability) to direct their future actions.10 Foreseeability
connects here to the notion of bounded rationality. When certain
events or consequences are unlikely to have formed a significant part
of an actor’s decisions for an action, the law characterizes them as unforeseeable and avoids attributing them to the actor. In economic
terms, foreseeability thus enables courts to distinguish between events
that are likely to have formed part of an actor’s ex ante incentives for
action and those that are unlikely to have done so, thereby restricting
recovery to the former alone.
Copyright law, much like the common law, is concerned with inducing behavior of a certain kind by incentivizing it. By providing
creators with an ex post reward, it attempts to incentivize their ex ante
production of creative expression. As an entitlement arising from the
bilateral context, copyright law is structurally very similar to other
common law areas. If the law (in other contexts) readily presumes that
actors can only ever factor foreseeable consequences into their decisionmaking process, then logically speaking, copyright law should see
little need to give creators an entitlement to unforeseeable ones. Copyright thus needs to internalize the idea that incentives have limits and
develop a mechanism by which to eliminate unincentivized gains from
a creator’s entitlement, especially when including them in the entitlement is likely to produce more costs than benefits.
This Article argues that, following from the common law’s use of
foreseeability to mark the outer boundaries of its incentive structure in
a variety of contexts, copyright law ought to employ a test of foreseeability to determine the point up to which a copyright owner should be
allowed to internalize the gains from his work. In determining liability
for infringement, applying a test of foreseeability would require a court
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
9 See Frank H. Easterbrook, The Supreme Court, 1983 Term—Foreword: The Court and the
Economic System, 98 HARV. L. REV. 4, 10 (1984) (describing these as the “ex post” and “ex ante”
perspectives, respectively).
10 See A. MITCHELL POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS 130 (2d
ed. 1989) (referring to this as the “incentive question” underlying a rule).
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to ask whether the use complained of is one that the copyright owner
(that is, the plaintiff) could have reasonably foreseen at the time that
the work was created (that is, the point when the entitlement commences). Adopting an approach along these lines is likely to present
courts with a solution to the problem of new uses and later-developed
technologies, and a rational basis on which to mark the outer boundaries of copyright’s grant of exclusive rights — questions that have hitherto been resolved entirely on an ad hoc basis.
Limiting liability for copyright infringement by using foreseeability
is also likely to transform the way in which courts think about and
apply the doctrine of fair use. At present, the doctrine of fair use remains the primary mechanism of distinguishing between uses of the
work in order to determine over which ones the copyright holder
should be allowed to claim an exclusive right.11 Courts and scholars
have over the years developed formulations of the doctrine that speak
directly to this task, such as “transformative use” and “intrinsic use.”12
These formulations suffer from a host of well-documented problems,
almost all of which derive from the structural reality that, as a defense
to liability, fair use inevitably focuses on the defendant. In doing so,
the doctrine ignores altogether the plaintiff’s entitlement, and the reasons for it, once the work is brought into existence. Tying these questions to the initial question of liability would serve to mark the outer
boundaries of copyright exclusivity by connecting it to the ex ante incentive that copyright is meant to generate.
This Article proceeds as follows. Part II examines copyright law’s
principal justificatory theory: the theory of creator incentives. It sets
out the core assumptions central to the theory, analyzes the failure of
copyright doctrine to instantiate its avowed reliance on it, and lays out
the consequence of this failure. It thus attempts to make the case for a
new limiting device within copyright law that recognizes how incentives are (and indeed are not) capable of impacting actual decisionmaking among creators. Part III illustrates how the idea of foreseeability — used in other contexts to structure actor incentives and limit
windfalls that are thought to be inefficient or unfair — can serve that
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
11 It remains common consensus among copyright scholars that the fair use doctrine — as it is
structured and applied today — remains deeply flawed. See, e.g., Paul Goldstein, Fair Use in a
Changing World, 50 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 133, 133–34 (2003); Wendy J. Gordon, Keynote:
Fair Use: Threat or Threatened?, 55 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 903 (2005); Lydia Pallas Loren, Redefining the Market Failure Approach to Fair Use in an Era of Copyright Permission Systems, 5 J.
INTELL. PROP. L. 1 (1997); Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Fair Use and Market Failure: Sony Revisited,
82 B.U. L. REV. 975 (2002); David Nimmer, “Fairest of Them All” and Other Fairy Tales of Fair
Use, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter/Spring 2003, at 263; Sara K. Stadler, Copyright As Trade
Regulation, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 899 (2007).
12 See LEON E. SELTZER, EXEMPTIONS AND FAIR USE IN COPYRIGHT 24–25, 37–38
(1978) (identifying certain kinds of uses as “intrinsic”); infra section II.B.2, pp. 1584–89.
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very purpose. It begins by looking to foreseeability’s assumptions
about human predictive capabilities (deriving from the idea of
bounded rationality) and proceeds to analyze foreseeability’s use in different areas of the law, all in recognition of the limited behavioral
modification the law expects to induce. Part IV then attempts to introduce foreseeability to copyright law using a test of “foreseeable
copying.” It starts by setting out how the test would operate as part of
the infringement inquiry and illustrates how, given its use in the licensing context, extending the test to the infringement inquiry is likely to
present few issues of workability. Part IV then proceeds to argue that
a test of foreseeability remains perfectly compatible with, and in many
ways is mandated by, copyright’s theory of incentives. Part V responds to four potential objections to the use of foreseeability as an
idea in copyright law: (1) that it is likely to render copyright’s current
term of protection redundant, (2) that it might result in a significant
amount of indeterminacy in its application, (3) that it will result in
temporally differentiated entitlements, and lastly, (4) that it will inevitably involve a significant degree of hindsight in its application. Part
VI concludes.
II. COPYRIGHT LAW AND CREATOR INCENTIVES
As a property right — understood as a set of exclusive use privileges protected by an exclusionary right — copyright is premised on
the idea of allowing its holder to capture (or internalize) the benefits
associated with the use of his work.13 In spite of copyright’s status as
a property right, its scope and reach remain significantly limited.
Using a host of internal doctrines, copyright law limits the circumstances and ways in which an owner is permitted to exercise its grant
of exclusivity.14
While personality- and desert-based theories of copyright abound
in the literature,15 copyright law in the United States has undeniably
come to be understood almost entirely in utilitarian, incentive-driven
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
13

For an overview of the copyright-property linkage, see JAMES BOYLE, SHAMANS, SOFTSPLEENS: LAW AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE INFORMATION SOCIETY
(1996); and Justin Hughes, Copyright and Incomplete Historiographies: Of Piracy, Propertization,
and Thomas Jefferson, 79 S. CAL. L. REV. 993, 1046–69 (2006).
14 See Wendy J. Gordon, An Inquiry into the Merits of Copyright: The Challenges of Consistency, Consent, and Encouragement Theory, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1343, 1365–77 (1989). Some of
these doctrines include: the idea-expression dichotomy, the originality requirement, the rule of fixation, and the temporally limited nature of the grant. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 102, 302–05 (2006).
15 See, e.g., Justin Hughes, The Philosophy of Intellectual Property, 77 GEO. L.J. 287 (1988);
Linda J. Lacey, Of Bread and Roses and Copyrights, 1989 DUKE L.J. 1532; Alfred C. Yen, Restoring the Natural Law: Copyright As Labor and Possession, 51 OHIO ST. L.J. 517 (1990); Barbara
Friedman, Note, From Deontology to Dialogue: The Cultural Consequences of Copyright, 13 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 157 (1994).
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terms.16 Copyright law is thus thought to exist primarily to give authors (that is, creators) an incentive to create and thereafter disseminate their works publicly. But what is perhaps unique about copyright
law is that, in spite of its avowed adherence to this theory of incentives, its internal doctrinal devices do little to give effect to its theoretical basis. Limiting a party’s liability or entitlement by reference to its
underlying purpose is hardly novel. Tort law routinely does this. This
process is also rather well known in antitrust law. As part of the antitrust injury rule, courts ask whether the injury complained of by a
plaintiff was of “the type the antitrust laws were intended to prevent”
and arose as a consequence of “that which makes the defendants’ acts
unlawful.”17 Yet, in interpreting and developing different formulations
of copyright’s doctrinal devices, courts rarely, if ever, make reference
to incentives.
A. Copyright Incentives in Theory and Practice
Central to all of copyright law is the idea of incentives.18 Copyright, it is argued, exists to provide creators with an incentive to create
and disseminate their works publicly. While copyright scholars have
long attempted to make sense of copyright’s theory of incentives
and its limitations, in practice courts do surprisingly little to give effect
to the way in which copyright’s incentive structure is meant to
influence creativity. As a consequence, few dispute the fact that copyright’s theory of incentives today functions as little more than a trope
— but ironically enough, one that masks the real tradeoffs that copyright involves.19
Copyright’s incentives story is thought to track the claim about the
dynamic efficiency of property rights.20 By providing a creator with
limited exclusionary control over creative expression at time T2, the
system is thought to encourage the production of such expression at
time T1. Since copyright deals with subject matter that is by nature a
nonexcludable public good, the need for such exclusionary control is
thought to be particularly pronounced.21
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
16 Indeed, this instrumental mandate derives from copyright’s constitutional origins. See U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
17 Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 489 (1977); see Roger D. Blair &
Jeffrey L. Harrison, Rethinking Antitrust Injury, 42 VAND. L. REV. 1539 (1989).
18 See, e.g., Justin Hughes, Fair Use Across Time, 50 UCLA L. REV. 775, 797 (2003); Joseph P.
Liu, Copyright and Time: A Proposal, 101 MICH. L. REV. 409, 428 (2002).
19 See generally Stewart E. Sterk, Rhetoric and Reality in Copyright Law, 94 MICH. L. REV.
1197, 1198–1204 (1996) (describing the use of incentives rhetoric to justify copyright since its
inception).
20 WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 13 (2003).
21 Id. at 19.
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All the same, the exclusionary control that copyright confers interferes with the extent to which others may access and use that resource
in the future. It thus entails both a static and dynamic inefficiency.22
By enabling creators to price their works at a monopoly level, it reduces access to those works by users willing to pay a price lower than
that charged by the creator, but above the marginal cost of producing
it. This represents a static inefficiency, often referred to as copyright’s
“deadweight loss.”23 In addition, since creativity is almost always derivative, copyright’s phenomenon of exclusionary control also impedes
future creativity by restricting access to a creative work for potential
creators hoping to use the work as an input for a future creative output. This in turn represents a dynamic inefficiency.24 Copyright thus
has to balance the benefits of its incentive structure against its accessand use-limiting functions, which are costs that it imposes on society
as a whole. Professor William Landes and Judge Richard Posner
summarize this tradeoff well:
Unless there is power to exclude, the incentive to create intellectual property [that is, creative expression] in the first place may be impaired. . . .
[T]he result is the “access versus incentives” tradeoff: charging a price for
a public good reduces access to it (a social cost), making it artificially
scarce . . . but increases the incentive to create it in the first place, which
is a possibly offsetting social benefit.25

This tradeoff was first noted by the economist Kenneth Arrow,26
and has since been a central theme in almost all scholarly analyses of
copyright incentives.27 While some have analyzed it as a tradeoff be–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
22 For a concise discussion of these effects, see YOCHAI BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS: HOW SOCIAL PRODUCTION TRANSFORMS MARKETS AND FREEDOM 35–37 (2006).
23 See Niva Elkin-Koren, Copyright Policy and the Limits of Freedom of Contract, 12

BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 93, 99–100 (1997); William W. Fisher III, Reconstructing the Fair Use
Doctrine, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1659, 1702 (1988).
24 See BENKLER, supra note 22, at 36–37.
25 LANDES & POSNER, supra note 20, at 20–21.
26 See Kenneth J. Arrow, Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention, in
NAT’L BUREAU OF ECON. RESEARCH, THE RATE AND DIRECTION OF INVENTIVE ACTIVITY 609 (1962).
27 Scholarly work in the copyright area has often focused on the tradeoff and attempted to determine the optimal amount of protection (principally through the idea of price discrimination) as
a consequence of the tradeoff. See Fisher, supra note 23, at 1700–05 (“[T]o avoid underproduction
of original works, it is necessary to empower the creators of such works to charge fees for the
privilege of using them, but granting the creators that right causes monopoly losses, which vary
between types of copyrighted works.” Id. at 1703.); see also Yochai Benkler, An Unhurried View
of Private Ordering in Information Transactions, 53 VAND. L. REV. 2063 (2000); James Boyle,
Cruel, Mean, or Lavish? Economic Analysis, Price Discrimination and Digital Intellectual Property, 53 VAND. L. REV. 2007 (2000); Julie E. Cohen, Copyright and the Perfect Curve, 53 VAND.
L. REV. 1799 (2000); Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Reexamining Copyright’s Incentives-Access Paradigm,
49 VAND. L. REV. 483 (1996); Michael J. Meurer, Copyright Law and Price Discrimination, 23
CARDOZO L. REV. 55 (2001); Michael J. Meurer, Price Discrimination, Personal Use and Piracy:
Copyright Protection of Digital Works, 45 BUFF. L. REV. 845, 869–76 (1997); cf. Louis Kaplow,
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tween two endogenous variables within the copyright system, others
have argued that it involves a comparison between copyright’s purpose and an exogenous variable.28 Yet in either form, the idea that
copyright’s incentive structure comes with its own set of limits remains
well accepted among intellectual property scholars. While scholars
certainly disagree on how best to implement these limits — through
scope, breadth, or temporal restrictions — at a basic level, the incentives analysis in the public goods context is always understood as being about both expanding and curtailing an exclusionary entitlement.29
When it comes to implementing the theory, though, courts and policymakers tend to view copyright’s incentive structure in largely linear (and unipolar) terms.30 In this view, since copyright’s purpose lies
solely in encouraging creativity, any limitations to it are justifiable only
if they do not interfere with its incentive structure, which is in turn
presumed to extend to every marginal incentive. Additionally, in this
conception, the incentive provided by copyright’s promise of exclusivity is also thought to correlate directly with the overall production of
creative expression. Professor Jessica Litman aptly notes in describing
this model that it assumes “[a]n increase in the scope or subject matter
or duration of copyright . . . will inspire more and better authorship,
while a limitation on copyright will at the margin result in reduced authorial production.”31 The linear conception thus implies that there
exists “no good reason” within the very idea of incentives (the model’s
only frame of reference) for “why copyrights should not cover everything and last forever.”32 Not surprisingly then, one begins to see a
significant divergence between copyright’s theory of incentives as dis–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
The Patent-Antitrust Intersection: A Reappraisal, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1813 (1984) (discussing the
tradeoff in the patent law context).
28 For a clear statement of the endogenous version of the tradeoff that identifies incentives and
access as the twin, progress-driven goals of the copyright system, see Cohen, supra note 27, at
1801. Not surprisingly, those who accept the tradeoff in exogenous terms remain less convinced
of its centrality. See Jane C. Ginsburg, Authors and Users in Copyright, 45 J. COPYRIGHT
SOC’Y U.S.A. 1 (1997).
29 For a sample of some economic literature debating this question, see WILLIAM D. NORDHAUS, INVENTION, GROWTH, AND WELFARE (1969), which argues that temporal limits best
capture an incentives analysis. See also Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex
Economics of Patent Scope, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 839 (1990) (arguing that incentives analysis necessitates limits on a patent’s scope).
30 This phenomenon is often referred to as copyright’s “one-way ratchet.” See Jessica Litman,
War Stories, 20 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 337, 344 (2002); Sara K. Stadler, Incentive and Expectation in Copyright, 58 HASTINGS L.J. 433, 435 (2007); Rebecca Tushnet, Copy This Essay:
How Fair Use Doctrine Harms Free Speech and How Copying Serves It, 114 YALE L.J. 535, 543
(2004); Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, Adrift in the Digital Millennium Copyright Act: The Sequel,
26 U. DAYTON L. REV. 279, 290 (2001).
31 Litman, supra note 30, at 344.
32 Id.
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cussed in the literature and the idea of incentives as implemented
through copyright doctrine.
Professor Neil Netanel ascribes the popularity of this linear model
of copyright among courts to the growing influence of what he calls
the “neoclassicist” school of economics, which takes the neoclassical assumptions of incentives theory as a starting point, but juxtaposes them
with property ideas in an effort to minimize the transaction costs that
the system entails.33 The Supreme Court’s leading opinion on fair use,
Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises,34 is perhaps
aptly representative of the way in which courts use the idea of incentives in this linear conception. The question before the Court in
Harper & Row was whether the defendant’s unauthorized publication
of quotations from President Gerald Ford’s unpublished manuscript
was a fair use of the work.35 In concluding that it was not a form
of fair use, the Court’s analysis focused on the effect that characterizing the defendant’s actions as a form of fair use would have on copyright’s incentive structure.36 In other words, without examining
whether copyright’s incentive structure extended to the entitlement
that the plaintiff was claiming, it focused on the harm that the defendant’s actions might have on that ephemeral incentive. The idea of
“incentives” provided the Court with a rhetorical framework internal
to the copyright system by which to justify its decision, rather than a
meaningful basis with which to understand the very functioning of
that system. The Court found it wholly unnecessary to ask whether
extending copyright’s entitlement to the defendant’s actions was necessitated by its idea of incentives.37
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
33 Netanel, supra note 1, at 306–07. More recently, others have referred to this as the “Demsetzian” turn in copyright law, a reference to the seminal work by Professor Harold Demsetz describing the evolution of ownership and property rights as mechanisms to minimize transaction
costs and internalize both positive and negative externalities associated with certain actions. See
Brett M. Frischmann, Evaluating the Demsetzian Trend in Copyright Law, 3 REV. L. & ECON.
649 (2007). For a response by Professor Demsetz, see Harold Demsetz, Frischmann’s View of “Toward a Theory of Property Rights,” 4 REV. L. & ECON. 127 (2008).
34 471 U.S. 539 (1985). In the twenty-four years since the decision, in excess of fifty federal
courts have relied on Harper & Row’s fair use analysis in one way or another. As Professor Fisher predicted a few years after the decision in relation to the Court’s reliance on the theory of incentives, “[t]he imprimatur of the majority opinion in Harper & Row will undoubtedly contribute
to the currency and influence of the theory.” Fisher, supra note 23, at 1689 (citation omitted).
35 Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 542–45.
36 Id. at 557–59.
37 The Court has, since then, used copyright’s incentive structure purely as a rhetorical device
on more than one instance. See, e.g., Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 212 n.18 (2003)
(“[C]opyright law serves public ends by providing individuals with an incentive to pursue private
ones.”); Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 593 (1994) (“[S]ubstantial harm to [the
market for derivatives] would weigh against a finding of fair use, because the licensing of derivatives is an important economic incentive to the creation of originals.” (citation omitted)). To be
sure, courts do occasionally treat the incentives-access tradeoff as a meaningful basis by which to
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In the linear model of incentives, then, courts presume that absent
exogenously necessitated exceptions, copyright’s ownership structure is
independently limitless.38 Even if incentives are the reason for the entitlement, they exert little influence on its structure. Neoclassicist
thinking apart, though, one suspects that a major contributing factor
to this phenomenon lies in the failure of copyright doctrine to instantiate its theory of incentives in any meaningful way. Since courts lack a
meaningful mechanism by which to give effect to the way in which incentives operate, and the limitations attendant thereto, they rarely see
the need to have the idea of incentives play more than just a rhetorical
role.
B. The Absence of Purpose-Driven
Limits in Copyright Law
Despite copyright being premised entirely on the idea of incentives,
courts never look to its theory of incentives in delineating the scope
and extent of a creator’s entitlement in individual cases. To the extent
that they do ever refer to incentives, they do so to examine whether a
finding of no liability is likely to negatively impact future incentives,
when ironically enough, the structure of this incentive is never determined upfront.39
Copyright remains distinct from other forms of intellectual property, in that the absence of an administrative grantmaking entity (such
as the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office) ensures that it falls entirely
to courts to delineate the scope and extent of a creator’s entitlement.
In its most basic sense, copyright’s entitlement lies in its promise of exclusivity, a promise that is legally enforceable against interference by
third parties. Since courts remain the primary (or rather, sole) determinants of this entitlement in any given situation, they both validate
the entitlement and enforce it through either a property or liability
rule. The process of validation usually entails examining whether the
work in question meets the eligibility requirements to be protected,
while the enforcement process then circumscribes the entitlement by
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
understand copyright’s incentive structure, but these decisions are rare. A few notable examples
include Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984); and Suntrust Bank
v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257 (11th Cir. 2001).
38 See, e.g., Ringgold v. Black Entm’t Television, Inc., 126 F.3d 70, 73 (2d Cir. 1997) (“In the
absence of defenses, these exclusive rights normally give a copyright owner the right to seek royalties from others who wish to use the copyrighted work.”); Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc.,
60 F.3d 913, 929 (2d Cir. 1995) (“It is indisputable that, as a general matter, a copyright holder is
entitled to demand a royalty for licensing others to use its copyrighted work . . . .”); D.C. Comics
Inc. v. Reel Fantasy, Inc., 696 F.2d 24, 28 (2d Cir. 1982) (“[O]ne of the benefits of ownership of
copyrighted material is the right to license its use for a fee . . . .”).
39 See, e.g., Campbell, 510 U.S. at 598 (Kennedy, J., concurring); Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at
557.
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reference to the defendant’s actions. Both processes operate as limits
on the entitlement. While the latter is correlative, the former is in a
sense absolute.40 Yet, none of the doctrinal devices that courts use
in either process attempt to connect the entitlement to its underlying
purpose.
Copyright’s absolute limiting doctrines concern themselves most directly with the need to limit a creator’s monopoly power in order to
minimize the deadweight losses associated with its exercise.41 In one
sense, they therefore do give effect to the incentives-access tradeoff
discussed earlier. Yet, they function by making an a priori assumption
about where and how that tradeoff should lie, rather than allowing for
it to be examined in individual cases. To the extent that they relate to
incentives, then, they do so in somewhat inflexible, rule-utilitarian
terms. The purpose behind their limiting function is therefore largely
extrinsic to their operation in individual cases, and as a consequence
they do little to enable courts to circumscribe a creator’s entitlement
purposively.
Copyright law’s correlative limiting devices, on the other hand,
seem better placed to internalize its incentive theory. Since they involve determining the outer boundaries of a creator’s entitlement only
by reference to a specific action (the defendant’s), they might be used
to eliminate from the scope of the entitlement actions that were not
part of the incentive. Yet, neither of copyright law’s two principal correlative doctrines — substantial similarity and fair use — rely on its
attempt to induce creativity.
1. Substantial Similarity. — As part of the infringement inquiry,
the law requires a plaintiff to establish that the defendant copied the
protected work.42 Absent copying, liability for copyright infringement
is practically nonexistent.43 While copying certainly does entail a factual element (whether the defendant took elements of the plaintiff’s
work), it involves more than just that and carries with it a significant

–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
40 By “correlative” here, I mean that the inquiry is done relationally, by reference to the plaintiff and the defendant. The idea of correlativity is generally used to describe tort law’s entitlement structure, where liability is an attempt to connect the defendant’s actions to the plaintiff’s
harm through the law’s underlying normative goals. Professor Ernest Weinrib’s account of correlativity is perhaps the most widely accepted exposition of the idea. See ERNEST J. WEINRIB,
THE IDEA OF PRIVATE LAW (1995); Ernest J. Weinrib, Punishment and Disgorgement As Contract Remedies, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 55 (2003).
41 See Sterk, supra note 19, at 1210–13 (1996).
42 Perris v. Hexamer, 99 U.S. 674, 675–76 (1879); 4 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.01[B] (2007).
43 2 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 42, § 8.01[A], at 8-15 (“[A]bsent copying, there can be no
infringement of copyright, regardless of the extent of similarity.” (footnotes omitted)).
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normative dimension.44 This occurs as part of the rule of substantial
similarity, or as some call it, “actionable” copying.45
The doctrine of substantial similarity requires a plaintiff to establish not just that the works in question are similar, but that the similarity relates to the fundamental essence or structure of the work under copyright.46 It thus entails establishing that what the defendant
took from the plaintiff’s work is protected by copyright law to begin
with. As one court sought to define the process: “The traditional test
for substantial similarity is ‘whether the accused work is so similar to
the plaintiff’s work that an ordinary reasonable person would conclude that the defendant unlawfully appropriated the plaintiff’s protectible expression by taking material of substance and value.’”47 This
definition is replete with subjective terms of art (for example, “ordinary reasonable person,” “unlawfully appropriated,” and “substance
and value”), each of which requires further elucidation for the definition to be complete. This result is aptly indicative of the complexity
that the process entails.48 All the same, courts have over the years
sought to develop myriad formulations of the test to be applied to individual cases.
In attempting to classify these different formulations, Nimmer usefully divides them into two broad categories. The first, “comprehensive nonliteral similarity,” involves situations where the essence of the
work is copied, even if the copying is not literal (that is, not verbatim).49 Here, the tests all focus on extracting the essence of the plaintiff’s work without running afoul of the idea-expression dichotomy,
and then examining whether the defendant’s work copied the same.
The second category, “fragmented literal similarity,” involves cases
where the defendant’s work uses parts of the plaintiff’s work.50 The
copying is literal (that is, verbatim), but partial and dispersed. Substantial similarity here, Nimmer argues, cannot be decided except
by reference to the defendant’s purpose behind the copying, which un-

–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
44 4 id. § 13.01[B], at 13-8 (noting that “few courts or commentators have historically differentiated” between the factual and normative dimensions of copying (footnote omitted)).
45 See id. at 13-9.
46 ROBERT C. OSTERBERG & ERIC C. OSTERBERG, SUBSTANTIAL SIMILARITY IN COPYRIGHT LAW § 1:1, at 1-1 to -4 (2008).
47 Country Kids ’N City Slicks, Inc. v. Sheen, 77 F.3d 1280, 1288 (10th Cir. 1996) (quoting Atari, Inc. v. N. Am. Philips Consumer Elecs. Corp., 672 F.2d 607, 614 (7th Cir. 1982)).
48 See OSTERBERG & OSTERBERG, supra note 46, § 1:1, at 1-2 (“Substantial similarity is an
elusive concept.”); see also Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Martin Weiner Corp., 274 F.2d 487, 489 (2d
Cir. 1960) (L. Hand, J.) (noting that the determination must “inevitably be ad hoc”).
49 See 4 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 42, § 13.03[A][1], at 13-36.
50 Id. § 13.03[A][2].
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fortunately is a question usually reserved for the fair use inquiry.51
Consequently, courts usually focus on whether what the defendant
took was of significant value to the plaintiff’s (though not the defendant’s) work in determining whether to characterize the copying as
substantial.
What should be most apparent from these tests, though, is that the
substantial similarity test always involves comparing the works themselves.52 To the limited extent that it looks to the defendant’s use or
purpose, it does so exclusively to compare the components of the two
similar works.53 Nowhere does it look to the plaintiff’s purpose or intent in creating the work to elucidate a possible incentive and compare
it in turn to the defendant’s. Thus, while it relates the defendant’s (infringing) work to the plaintiff’s protected one, any inquiry into copyright’s overall purpose (generally or specifically) is considered altogether extraneous.
2. Fair Use. — Questions of purpose are ordinarily understood as
being a part of the fair use inquiry. Using a list of four statutorily delineated nondispositive factors, courts have significant leeway to conclude that a defendant’s use of the copyrighted work is insufficiently
harmful to the plaintiff’s interests.54 While the fair use inquiry was
originally meant to focus on parties’ purposes in using the work, in
practice it too places large reliance on the amount and significance of
the defendant’s copying, with the result that an independent substantial similarity requirement often becomes superfluous or subsumed
within the fair use inquiry.
Further, even as a recognized limit on a creator’s property interest
in the expression, fair use exhibits several structural infirmities. Perhaps the most important of these lies in the fact that it is an “affirmative defense,” meaning that the burden is placed on the defendant to
prove that his use satisfies some or all of the statutory requirements.55
This is unlike even the rule of substantial similarity, which, as an element of the infringement inquiry, is a recognized part of the plaintiff’s
burden. The doctrine thus works to limit the copyright grant by de–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
51 Id. at 13-54. He notes that, as a consequence, the line between the two requirements often
gets blurred. But see Nelson v. PRN Prods., Inc., 873 F.2d 1141, 1143 (8th Cir. 1989) (rejecting an
attempt to conflate the two and alter the burden of proof).
52 See OSTERBERG & OSTERBERG, supra note 46, § 2:1, at 2-1 (observing that substantial
similarity always entails a “comparison of the works”).
53 The substantial similarity requirement is applied even to derivative works, which by their
very nature involve a different purpose, pointing to the general irrelevance of the purpose and use
to which the work is put. See id. § 15:1, at 15-1, 15-2 n.2.
54 See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006). In general terms the four factors are: (1) the purpose and character of the defendant’s use; (2) the nature of the protected work; (3) the amount and substantiality of the portion of the work used; and (4) the impact of the defendant’s actions on the actual and
potential market for the protected work. Id.
55 3 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 42, § 12.11[F].
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pending entirely on the defendant’s ability to convince a court that his
activities are unlikely to impact a creator’s otherwise protected interest. The copyright owner is thus deemed entitled to internalize all
possible benefits, until the fair use determination concludes otherwise.56 In focusing on this presumptive entitlement by itself, fair use
does very little in practice to link the defendant’s actions (that is, copying) with the creator’s original incentive.
While fair use is today codified in the Copyright Act,57 its intrinsic
open-endedness has resulted in few general principles being discernible
in both its theory and its practice. Courts have characterized fair use
as the “most troublesome [doctrine] in the whole law of copyright”58
and as “defy[ing] definition.”59 Yet, a few specific formulations stand
out that might be thought to have some connection to copyright’s incentive structure.
(a) Transformative Use or Purpose. — Since the first part of the
fair use test revolves around the “purpose” for which the defendant
uses the protected work,60 some have suggested that courts should look
beyond just the binary distinction between the commercial and noncommercial nature of the defendant’s use to answer this question. The
transformative use test requires courts to examine whether a use complained of is transformative, in its being “productive” and “employ[ing]
the [protected] matter in a different manner or for a different purpose
from the original.”61 Under this approach, courts are to see if the defendant’s use adds value to the plaintiff’s original use — value being
understood outside of its purely commercial sense.62
At first glance, one might see “transformative use” as having some
connection to creator incentives, especially in its reliance on parties’
purposes in using the work. If a defendant’s use is so different (that is,
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
56 Thus, if the defendant were not to raise the defense, courts would operate on the assumption that the plaintiff is entitled to control the market in which the defendant is operating. For a
recent example, see Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. v. Cablevision Systems Corp., 478 F. Supp.
2d 607 (S.D.N.Y. 2007). There, the defendant agreed not to raise the defense of fair use, id. at
616, with the consequence that the court merely had to conclude that the defendants had copied
or performed the plaintiff’s work. See id. at 616, 622.
57 Interestingly, fair use originated as a common law doctrine, see Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas.
342 (1841), and was codified in the 1976 Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006).
58 Dellar v. Samuel Goldwyn, Inc., 104 F.2d 661, 662 (2d Cir. 1939); see also Sony Corp. of Am.
v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 475 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
59 Princeton Univ. Press v. Mich. Document Servs., Inc., 99 F.3d 1381, 1392 (6th Cir. 1996)
(quoting Time Inc. v. Bernard Geis Assocs., 293 F. Supp. 130, 144 (S.D.N.Y. 1968)) (internal quotation mark omitted).
60 17 U.S.C. § 107(1).
61 Pierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1111 (1990).
62 Id. The Supreme Court endorsed Judge Leval’s test in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc.,
510 U.S. 569 (1994), drawing a distinction between superseding and transformative uses of a work
based on market substitution. See generally Christopher S. Yoo, Copyright and Public Good Economics: A Misunderstood Relation, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 635, 711–12 (2007).
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transformative) from the plaintiff’s, one might think it illogical to conclude that the possibility of controlling it was any part of the plaintiff’s
ex ante incentive. In reality, though, the existence of a transformative
purpose is only ever understood through the content and never as an
independent variable.63 Thus, for uses that do not directly interact
with the substantive content of the work (by either altering it directly,
critiquing or commenting on it, or summarizing it), the transformative
use test becomes somewhat meaningless.64 Uses that involve converting a work from one format to another (regardless of what this entails),65 or that employ large portions of it within a broader business
model (for example Google’s Library Project66), are unlikely to satisfy
even the transformative use standard.67
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
63 The Second Circuit’s decision in Castle Rock Entertainment v. Carol Publishing Group,
Inc., 150 F.3d 132 (2d Cir. 1998), is aptly illustrative of this trend. In concluding that the defendant’s use of the protected work, which involved creating an aptitude test centering around a
well-known television series, was not a form of transformative use, the court concluded that the
defendant had failed to discharge its burden of showing that its use involved a significant “transformative purpose.” Id. at 143. Without specifying what a legitimate transformative purpose entailed, the court concluded that since the defendant’s work was substantially similar to the plaintiff’s and had only “minimally alter[ed]” it, there was no legitimate transformative purpose. Id.
The purpose, in other words, was to be examined via the content. See Matt Williams, Recent
Second Circuit Opinions Indicate that Google’s Library Project Is Not Transformative, 25 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 303, 318 (2007) (arguing that the Supreme Court’s decision in Campbell
is necessarily restricted to such an examination).
64 This conclusion derives from the Court’s emphasis in Campbell on the fact that the test is
whether the defendant creates a “new work [that] is ‘transformative,’” by “altering the first with
new expression, meaning, or message.” Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579 (quoting Leval, supra note 61,
at 1111); see also Stadler, supra note 11, at 906–07 (noting how the Campbell Court intended the
standard to apply only when a defendant “takes expression from a copyrighted work and adds
expression of her own”); Williams, supra note 63, at 319–30. Additionally, cases that have found
the standard to have been satisfied seem to emphasize this fact. See Blanch v. Koons, 467 F.3d
244 (2d Cir. 2006); Bill Graham Archives v. Dorling Kindersley Ltd., 448 F.3d 605 (2d Cir. 2006).
Two recent decisions of the Ninth Circuit, however, seem to have glossed over this requirement altogether. It is not clear that they apply the test as formulated in Campbell. See Perfect 10,
Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 487 F.3d 701 (9th Cir. 2007); Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811
(9th Cir. 2003); see also 4 WILLIAM F. PATRY, PATRY ON COPYRIGHT § 10:21, at 10-79 n.33
(2008) (characterizing the Kelly holding as “novel” and its reliance on public benefit as part of the
transformative use test as “perplexing”); Justin Hughes, Size Matters (or Should) in Copyright
Law, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 575, 619 n.254 (2005) (noting that the Kelly decision “sits uneasily”
with the Supreme Court’s interpretation of “transformative”); Williams, supra note 63, at 317–19
(characterizing the Kelly case as a “misapplication”).
65 Thus, translations of a work from one language to another have been held insufficient to
meet the standard. See, e.g., Nihon Keizai Shimbun, Inc. v. Comline Bus. Data, Inc., 166 F.3d 65,
72 (2d Cir. 1999). Converting a work from one media format to another is considered equally
nontransformative. See, e.g., Infinity Broadcast Corp. v. Kirkwood, 150 F.3d 104, 108 (2d Cir.
1998); see also Hughes, supra note 64, at 619 n.254 (“[I]t is the work, not the distribution mechanism, that needs to be transformative.”).
66 See generally Jonathan Band, The Google Library Project: Both Sides of the Story, 1 PLAGIARY 1, 3–7 (2007) (describing Google’s fair use argument in the actual litigation).
67 See Williams, supra note 63, at 330–32.
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Transformative use, as it is understood today, does nothing to connect fair use to a creator’s incentive. The overbearing emphasis placed
on the work itself, and the rendering of the “purpose” element of the
test practically meaningless, aptly reflect this.
(b) Market Failure. — The second and arguably more influential
attempt to give the fair use doctrine a rational basis employs an economic model of market failure and is commonly associated with the
work of Professor Wendy Gordon.68 In this conception, the fair use
doctrine exists exclusively to remedy situations of market failure.69
Fair use, in this formulation, is to be permitted by courts only when
(1) the existence of a market failure is shown; (2) a defendant’s access
to (and use of) the work is socially desirable; and, most important for
our purposes, (3) it would not interfere substantially with the plaintiff’s original incentive.70 On the face of it, the market failure model
appears to relate fair use to creators’ incentives in its third requirement. On closer analysis, though, it does not. Much like its assumption about the creator’s original entitlement, the model starts from the
assumption that a creator’s incentive lies in unfettered control over all
possible uses and that anything that detracts from such control is necessarily an interference with that incentive. The creator’s entitlement
is thus thought to consist of all market-based uses of a work; anything
short of that is presumed to be an insufficient inducement. Yet the
market failure model does not give us a basis for this assumption, ex71
cept in terms of a general preference for authors. The market failure
model, then, does little more than refer to the potential impact that a
finding of noninfringement might have on the incentive, and does little
to tell us what the contours of that incentive are.
(c) Time-based Proposals. — More recently, others have argued
that a commitment to copyright’s incentive structure necessitates calibrating the fair use analysis to fluctuations in the market value for a
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
68 See Wendy J. Gordon, Fair Use As Market Failure: A Structural and Economic Analysis of
the Betamax Case and Its Predecessors, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1600 (1982) [hereinafter Gordon,
Fair Use]. The dissenting opinion in Sony Corp. (arguing that the defendant’s use was not fair
use) relies on Gordon’s article. See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S.
417, 478 (1984) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). More recently, Gordon has clarified her position. See
Wendy J. Gordon, Market Failure and Intellectual Property: A Response to Professor Lunney, 82
B.U. L. REV. 1031 (2002).
69 Gordon, Fair Use, supra note 68, at 1614–15; Robin A. Moore, Note, Fair Use and Innovation Policy, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 944, 950 (2007).
70 Gordon, Fair Use, supra note 68, at 1614.
71 The following is perhaps illustrative:
New technologies will make certain copyrighted works more valuable . . . . If copyright
protection is denied because of an otherwise curable market failure, then the additional
revenues that would have flowed from the new technological use will not appear. If the
authors’ revenues fail to reflect the additional value that new technology gives to such
works, then insufficient resources may be drawn into their creation.
Id. at 1621.
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creative work across its lifespan.72 Professor Justin Hughes, for instance, notes that the fair use analysis needs to look to the present value of a work at the time the decision was made to invest into its creation or distribution.73 Hughes’ argument recognizes that fair use in its
current iteration does absolutely nothing to connect a creator’s entitlement to the ex ante incentive. All the same, his proposal would do
no more than have courts be more accepting of fair use arguments as a
work grows older, rather than have them concretely adhere to the idea
of creator incentives in constructing the initial entitlement.74 His solution thus does not quite force copyright to be “true to [its] ex ante incentive structure,” as he claims it should.75
(d) Limiting the Elusive Fourth Factor. — Perhaps more importantly, though, courts too have occasionally tried to understand fair use
as a purpose-driven limit on creators’ entitlement. Yet, this purpose
has never directly been tied to a creator’s ex ante incentive. In the
context of the fourth statutory fair use factor, which requires identifying a potential market for the plaintiff’s work and the impact of the
defendant’s use on that market,76 plaintiffs often seek to argue that
their market entitlement includes a market for licenses to use the
work.77 In this construction, every use of the work by the defendant
has a substitutive effect on the plaintiff’s market — for even if the
plaintiff’s use is not in direct competition with the defendant’s, the
plaintiff’s ability to license that use certainly is.78
To avoid this circularity, courts have occasionally observed that the
market inquiry needs to be limited to “traditional, reasonable, or likely
to be developed” markets for the work.79 All the same, without an
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
72 See Hughes, supra note 18, at 778. A somewhat more elaborate version of the proposal was
made around the same time by Professor Joseph Liu. See Liu, supra note 18. Yet, unlike Hughes,
Liu bases his proposal not on the need to bring copyright doctrine closer to its theory of incentives, but rather on the problems associated with the extension of copyright’s term of protection.
Id. at 411–12 & n.10 (noting this difference).
73 Hughes, supra note 18, at 782–83.
74 Id. at 778.
75 Id. at 782.
76 See 17 U.S.C. § 107(4) (2006) (listing as a factor for fair use “the effect of the use upon the
potential market for or value of the copyrighted work”).
77 See, e.g., Ringgold v. Black Entm’t Television, Inc., 126 F.3d 70, 81 (2d Cir. 1997); Princeton
Univ. Press v. Mich. Document Servs., Inc., 99 F.3d 1381, 1388 (6th Cir. 1996); Am. Geophysical
Union v. Texaco Inc., 60 F.3d 913, 929–30 (2d Cir. 1994).
78 For more on this circularity problem, see 4 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 42,
§ 13.05[A][4], at 13-196 to -198; Matthew Africa, The Misuse of Licensing Evidence in Fair Use
Analysis: New Technologies, New Markets, and the Courts, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1145, 1160 (2000);
Fisher, supra note 23, at 1671; Mark Lemley, Should a Licensing Market Require Licensing?,
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 2007, at 185, 190; Loren, supra note 11, at 38–41; Lunney,
supra note 11, at 1021; and Stadler, supra note 11, at 903–04.
79 Am. Geophysical Union, 60 F.3d at 930; see also Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation
Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 568 (1985) (using a similar “normal market” criterion).
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identifiable basis by which to identify a market as traditional or reasonable, the limit becomes meaningless. How and when should this
determination be made? Courts have thus based the determination on
plaintiffs’ post-creation ability, motive, interest, or expectation to enter
a certain market — but never on their ex ante incentive in creating the
work, which is the inducement that copyright is meant to be about.
Unless “traditional” or “reasonable” are related back to the time of creation — the point when the incentive to create is meant to operate —
they bear little connection to the idea of creator incentives.80
Fair use in its myriad formulations, both judicial and academic,
thus remains a weak basis by which to limit copyright by reference to
its underlying theory of incentives. Indeed, the complexity and incoherence that its jurisprudence seems to have generated might be
enough reason to look elsewhere.
C. The Social Costs of Copyright Windfalls
To reiterate, because there exists no independent basis by which
courts can relate copyright’s entitlement structure to its underlying
purpose, markets that use the work in ways that are unlikely to have
formed a significant part of the creator’s incentive in creating it are
nonetheless deemed part of the creator’s exclusionary entitlement.
Uses for a work that are either temporally or causally disconnected
from the creator’s actions inevitably then get attributed and allocated
to the creator.
In numerous other contexts, courts and scholars have long characterized as windfalls the unexpected gains and losses that accrue to individuals independent of any possible effort they could have exerted to
bring them about.81 Central to the idea of a windfall is the recognition
that the actual value of an event after its occurrence is far in excess of
its estimated value before it occurs, such that an individual is unlikely
to have been incentivized to bring it about (or avoid it).82 Windfalls
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
80 As a historical matter, interestingly, the common law standard seems to have required relating fair use to the time of publication. See Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 550 (“[The] fair use doctrine was predicated on the author’s implied consent to ‘reasonable and customary’ use when he
released his work for public consumption.” (emphasis added)).
81 See Eric Kades, Windfalls, 108 YALE L.J. 1489, 1491 (1999) (defining windfalls as “economic gains independent of work, planning, or other productive activities that society wishes to
reward” (emphasis omitted)).
82 See Gideon Parchomovsky, Peter Siegelman & Steve Thel, Of Equal Wrongs and Half
Rights, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 738, 756 (2007) (describing windfalls in terms of the perceivable costs
and benefits of undertaking an action to bring about or avoid an event). Professors Parchomovsky, Siegelman, and Thel connect their description to tort law’s well-known formulation of
incentives to take care (that is, the Learned Hand formula). Id. at 756 n.66. Thus windfalls represent situations where the costs C of bringing about an event causally exceed the expected benefits from the event, measured by the probability of its occurrence P multiplied by any gains G
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thus represent unincentivized gains and losses that were neither obtainable nor avoidable ex ante. In this sense, then, providing creators
with an entitlement beyond what would have incentivized them in the
creative process represents a similar windfall.83
Why is this necessarily harmful? As an exclusionary mechanism
over an otherwise nonrivalrous resource, copyright is known to impose
significant social costs. As noted earlier, it creates both static and dynamic inefficiencies, encourages rent-seeking, and entails costs associated with its enforcement by courts.84 In general, these costs are believed to be outweighed by the social benefits that the system
produces, in the nature of the inducement to produce creative works
of expression, rendering them tolerable.85 In relation to windfalls,
though, these costs are not necessarily counterbalanced by the incentive to create, since these windfalls represent, by their very nature, unincentivized gains. To be sure, windfalls do occur in other contexts
and are very often tolerated when they are thought unlikely to interfere significantly with an institution’s overall goals and purposes.86
In practical terms, copyright windfalls allow creators to engage in
monopolistic pricing in new markets that are unlikely to have formed a
crucial part of their incentives in creating the work. In addition, in relation to new uses and later-developed technologies, these windfalls
give creators control over markets that they clearly are not best positioned to develop. Thus, providing creators with control over new
mediums of distribution87 or new devices that use their creations88
(both of which are usually developed by third parties) does little more
than actively facilitate a potential holdout, raising the transaction costs
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
from the event, in the ex ante world. Cex ante > G·P. The expected benefits are therefore insufficient ex ante to independently generate an incentive to bring about the event causally.
83 Indeed, in Mills Music, Inc. v. Snyder, 469 U.S. 153 (1985), a dissenting minority of four
justices made the exact same argument. Id. at 187–88 (White, J., dissenting). The Court there
was concerned with the allocation of royalties between an author and a publisher following the
partial termination of a license. The work had been created and licensed well in advance of the
Copyright Act of 1976, which extended the term of protection by an additional period. Id. Consequently, the parties could not have acted in “reliance” on the additional benefits since they were
not anticipated, and the gains thus represented a “windfall” that needed to be allocated. Id. at
188.
84 See Wendy J. Gordon & Robert G. Bone, Copyright, in 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND
ECONOMICS 189, 194–96 (Boudewijn Bouckaert & Gerrit De Geest eds., 2000); Mark A. Lemley,
Property, Intellectual Property, and Free Riding, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1031, 1058–59 (2005) (elaborating on these costs).
85 See William W. Fisher III, Property and Contract on the Internet, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REV.
1203, 1249 (1998).
86 See Kades, supra note 81, at 1521.
87 See, e.g., Teleprompter Corp. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 415 U.S. 394 (1974); Fortnightly
Corp. v. United Artists Television, Inc., 392 U.S. 390 (1968); see also Tim Wu, Copyright’s Communications Policy, 103 MICH. L. REV. 278, 279 (2004).
88 See, e.g., Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
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for developers of new media and devices and stifling innovation in the
process.
III. FORESEEABILITY AND LIMITS TO INCENTIVES
If copyright is to be true to its theory of incentives, it needs a doctrinal device that limits its grant of exclusivity by reference to the ex
ante incentive that it is meant to generate. In a host of other areas, the
common law employs incentives to produce behavioral modification
among individuals, and in the process actively employs a device to objectively shape its incentive structure and balance its ex ante purpose
against its ex post effects: foreseeability. Foreseeability is commonly
understood as “[t]he quality of being reasonably anticipatable.”89 In
the common law, however, courts use it to identify the point beyond
which the possibility of an entitlement or liability accruing is unlikely
to have influenced an actor’s ex ante behavior, thereby rendering the
occurrence unforeseeable — or, a windfall. Windfalls thus represent
unincentivized gains and losses, and the law uses foreseeability to dislodge them from the liability or entitlement determination. Foreseeability is thus likely to provide copyright law with a logical basis
by which to limit its grant of exclusivity by reference to the idea of
incentives.
A. Foreseeability and the Common Law
Foreseeability provides courts with a basis on which to mark the
outer boundaries of liability in different contexts, by differentiating between events that were likely to have been anticipated by individuals
and those that were not. It is worth emphasizing, though, that foreseeability adds little normative content on its own. In other words, the
reasons why only events or outcomes that could have been anticipated
ought to be attributed to an actor as part of the liability or entitlement
determination remain external to the idea of foreseeability itself. They
derive instead from the different policies and principles underlying the
legal regime in question.
Across different areas of the common law, foreseeability does exhibit one important functional similarity. This similarity relates to the
common law’s use of economic incentives to regulate future behavior.
While the common law is concerned with the allocation of losses arising from an event, its basis for doing so is at the same time forwardlooking.90 It thus attempts additionally to induce loss-avoiding (or
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
89
90

BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 660 (7th ed. 1999).
Some scholars refer to this process as the “social engineering” function of the common law.
See Howard A. Latin, Problem-Solving Behavior and Theories of Tort Liability, 73 CAL. L. REV.
677, 677 n.2 (1985). Others refer to it as an issue of incentives. See POLINSKY, supra note 10, at
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cost-minimizing) behavior by similarly situated actors in the future.91
The possibility of liability for harm, or indeed the absence of the same,
is thought to provide rational individuals with an incentive to modify
their behavior ex ante, that is, prior to the occurrence of the chain of
events that would result in the harm. The same holds true for benefits. The likelihood of a benefit-maximizing entitlement, the common
law assumes, will lead actors to modify their behavior in such a way as
to be able to claim the entitlement.
Interestingly, though, the behavioral modification that the law expects as a result of this incentive effect is not infinite. Foreseeability
comes into play here. The law recognizes that given what individuals
are cognitively capable of factoring into their ex ante decisionmaking,
events that are incapable of being anticipated — and consequently the
costs and benefits associated with them — are likely to have little influence on their decisions. It thus characterizes them as unforeseeable,
in the recognition that they form no part of individuals’ ex ante incentives for action.
What implicitly seems to motivate the common law’s deployment
of foreseeability across different areas, however, is a common understanding of the way in which individuals process information under
conditions of extreme uncertainty. This understanding is connected to
the idea of “bounded rationality.”92 Bounded rationality is today
commonly associated with the field of behavioral economics and is
used there to refer to the empirical task of identifying various cognitive shortcuts or biases that individuals use in their decisionmaking —
shortcuts that often result in inefficient (or suboptimal) outcomes.93
Independent of its use there, however, bounded rationality also refers
to a basis by which to comprehend the ways in which individuals behave in situations of complexity and uncertainty. Its use in this con–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
130; Marcel Kahan, Causation and Incentives To Take Care Under the Negligence Rule, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 427 (1989).
91 See Latin, supra

note 90, at 677 (laying out the basic postulates of the idea of behavioral
modification).
92 Professor Herbert Simon is credited with developing the idea of bounded rationality, beginning in the 1950s. See Herbert A. Simon, A Behavioral Model of Rational Choice, 69 Q.J. ECON.
99 (1955); Herbert A. Simon, Human Nature in Politics: The Dialogue of Psychology with Political Science, 79 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 293 (1985); Herbert A. Simon, On the Behavioral and Rational Foundations of Economic Dynamics, 5 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 35 (1984); Herbert A.
Simon, Rationality in Psychology and Economics, 59 J. BUS. S209 (1986).
93 See Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, 185 SCIENCE 1124 (1974). For work extending these ideas to the analysis of law, see Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein & Richard Thaler, A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50
STAN. L. REV. 1471 (1998); Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science:
Removing the Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1051 (2000);
and Thomas S. Ulen, The Growing Pains of Behavioral Law and Economics, 51 VAND. L. REV.
1747 (1998). See also RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS (2008).
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text is seen most prominently in the economics of organization, also referred to as transaction cost economics (TCE), beginning with the
work of Professor Oliver Williamson.94 Here, the idea operates as a
descriptive (rather than empirical) claim about the way in which individuals do and do not process information. Since individuals are incapable of predicting all future contingencies associated with their actions, they are believed to act in ways that reflect this limitation
(referred to by some as “predictive uncertainty”95). Predictive uncertainty is especially applicable when events are highly complex, or indeed stochastic.96 Organizational economics uses this idea as a premise by which to understand all contracting as necessarily incomplete, as
far as future contingencies go.97
More importantly, though, what remains distinctive about the use
of bounded rationality in this organizational context is that here it remains perfectly compatible with the basic idea that actors are indeed
utility maximizers. The inability to foresee (or predict) the future is
taken to be a transaction cost on which the system attempts to economize.98 The only modification it thus makes is to say that individuals
have limited information in situations of uncertainty or complexity,
causing them in turn to economize with this limited information rather
than acquire additional information to eliminate this uncertainty. The
distinction between the idea here and its use in the modern context of
behavioral economics is that the latter is concerned directly with “deci–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
94 See OLIVER WILLIAMSON, ANTITRUST ECONOMICS: MERGERS, CONTRACTING, AND
STRATEGIC BEHAVIOR 74–78 (1987); OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES: ANALYSIS AND ANTITRUST IMPLICATIONS 21–26 (1975); Oliver E. Williamson, The
New Institutional Economics: Taking Stock, Looking Ahead, 38 J. ECON. LITERATURE 595, 600
(2000) (“There is close to unanimity within the [new institutional economics] on the idea of limited
cognitive competence — often referred to as bounded rationality.”).
95 For uses of this term in different contexts deriving from bounded rationality, see RICHARD
R. NELSON & SIDNEY G. WINTER, AN EVOLUTIONARY THEORY OF ECONOMIC CHANGE
88 (1982); Adam B. Badawi, Interpretive Preferences and the Limits of the New Formalism, 6
BERKELEY BUS. L.J. (forthcoming 2009) (manuscript at 9, on file with the Harvard Law School
Library); and Tomas Hellström & Merle Jacob, Uncertainty and Values: The Case of Environmental Impact Assessment, 9 KNOWLEDGE & POL’Y 70, 76 (1996).
96 Indeed, its use in this context has spawned a secondary body of literature attempting to understand the role it plays in the overall analysis. See, e.g., John Conlisk, Why Bounded Rationality?, 34 J. ECON. LITERATURE 669 (1996); Nicolai J. Foss, Bounded Rationality in the Economics of Organization: Present Use and (Some) Future Possibilities, 5 J. MGMT. & GOVERNANCE
401 (2001); Oliver Hart, Is “Bounded Rationality” an Important Element of a Theory of Institutions?, 146 J. INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL ECON. 696 (1990). Some scholars additionally
attempt to distinguish between bounded rationality and “indeterminacy,” the situation where multiple solutions to a single problem exist. See, e.g., Roy Radner, Bounded Rationality, Indeterminacy, and the Theory of the Firm, 106 ECON. J. 1360 (1996).
97 See, e.g., Oliver Hart & John Moore, Foundations of Incomplete Contracts, 66 REV. ECON.
STUD. 115 (1999); Eric Maskin & Jean Tirole, Unforeseen Contingencies and Incomplete Contracts, 66 REV. ECON. STUD. 83 (1999).
98 See Maskin & Tirole, supra note 97, at 83–84.
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sion processes” — the ways in which individuals react to contingencies
— while the former is directed at modeling “governance structures”
and economizing on costs as part of that process.99 In the latter context, it thus functions principally as an explanatory vehicle internal to
the standard economic account of the law rather than as an empirical
assertion about individuals being irrational in their behavior.100
It is in this second, limited context — via the idea of predictive uncertainty — that foreseeability connects to bounded rationality. It instantiates the idea across two (often interconnected) dimensions: one
causal, and the other temporal. Individuals are thought incapable of
anticipating all the consequences that their actions cause, especially
consequences that extend far into the future. Foreseeability thus requires a court to evaluate future uncertain events as they would have
occurred to the individual at the time the decision to act was made
and to classify those events and outcomes into (1) those that were capable of being causally and temporally anticipated at the time (foreseeable) and (2) those that were not (unforeseeable). The law then factors only those likely to be anticipated during the decisionmaking
process into the liability or entitlement determination. This general
framework characterizes the common law’s use of foreseeability across
numerous areas.
1. Tort Law: Negligence. — Foreseeability is perhaps most prominently used in the area of tort law, specifically in the context of liability for negligence. Foreseeability is used to determine the existence of
a duty of care to the plaintiff, or alternatively the existence of proximate causation between the defendant’s actions and the harm
caused.101 In both contexts, it helps courts draw an outer limit to
causal attribution.
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
99 See OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM 46
(1985).
100 Indeed, Williamson notes that the use of bounded rationality in the organizational context
actually “enlarges . . . the scope for rationality analysis” in the traditional economic account.
Oliver E. Williamson, Assessing Contract, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 177, 180 (1985). Some refer to
this as the “thin” conception of bounded rationality, as opposed to its use as a “thick” conception
in the world of behavioral economics. See Nicolai J. Foss, Bounded Rationality in the Economics
of Organization: “Much Cited and Little Used,” 24 J. ECON. PSYCH. 245, 246 (2003); Foss, supra
note 96, at 402. Indeed, some believe that since it does little independent work in the analysis, its
use is somewhat unnecessary. See Hart, supra note 96, at 700–01. Yet, as its advocates continue
to emphasize, it provides rhetorical support to an otherwise intuitive part of the basic model.
Foss, supra note 96, at 406. It is in principally the same vein that I attempt to connect it to the
idea of foreseeability. Additionally, scholars in the tradition of organizational economics attempting to model bounded rationality in legal terms have long made this connection in the literature.
See Paul L. Joskow, Commercial Impossibility, the Uranium Market and the Westinghouse Case,
6 J. LEGAL STUD. 119, 157 (1977) (“The foreseeability requirement may only make sense if we
introduce the concept of ‘bounded rationality.’”).
101 See W. Jonathan Cardi, Purging Foreseeability, 58 VAND. L. REV. 739, 747–50, 755–67
(2005).
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In the context of the duty of care, courts ask whether the plaintiff
in question was within the scope of the duty imposed on the defendant. They limit the duty of care owed by reference to the consequences that were foreseeable at the time the risk was created.102
Proximate cause, on the other hand, attempts to connect the defendant’s conduct to the plaintiff’s injury by eliminating from the liability
calculus consequences whose attribution to the defendant would be
impractical or unjust.103 Foreseeability reappears here, when courts
assert that proximate causation does not exist because the injury that
occurred was not foreseeable to the defendant.104
In both contexts, foreseeability helps courts “sort[] consequences into the set of those payable by the tortfeasor, and the set of those found
too distant . . . to be attributed to the tortfeasor.”105 In the absence of
this sorting, tort liability would be unlimited. Individuals would be
liable for outcomes that could be attributed to them through an unending chain of factual events.106 Foreseeability limits such absurdities.
Through a system of liability, tort law attempts to create an ex ante
incentive for individuals to take adequate precautionary measures and
exercise due care when their actions entail risks. When the cost of liability (multiplied by the probability of its occurrence) exceeds the cost
of precaution or prevention, it is thought to generate an incentive for
due care.107 Unforeseeable consequences, disastrous as they may be,
are characterized by low probabilities of occurrence and possibly additional costs associated with detecting, predicting, and guarding against
them.108 Liability for unforeseeable consequences is thus unlikely to
create an incentive for greater care, because rational individuals will
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
102
103

See, e.g., Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928).
See DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS § 180, at 443 (2001); W. PAGE KEETON ET AL.,
PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 41, at 264 (5th ed. 1984) (“‘Proximate
Cause’ — in itself an unfortunate term — is merely the limitation which the courts have placed
upon the actor’s responsibility for the consequences of the actor’s conduct. . . . Some boundary
must be set to liability for the consequences of any act, upon the basis of some social idea of justice or policy.”).
104 See, e.g., Ballard v. Uribe, 715 P.2d 624, 628 n.6 (Cal. 1986) (en banc); Neering v. Ill. Cent.
R.R. Co., 50 N.E.2d 497, 503 (Ill. 1943); Osborne v. Atl. Ice & Coal Co., 177 S.E. 796, 796 (N.C.
1935); Mudrich v. Standard Oil Co., 90 N.E.2d 859, 863 (Ohio 1950); Read v. Scott Fetzer Co., 990
S.W.2d 732, 737 (Tex. 1998); Doe v. Boys Clubs of Greater Dallas, Inc., 907 S.W.2d 472, 478 (Tex.
1995).
105 Saul Levmore, The Wagon Mound Cases: Foreseeability, Causation, and Mrs. Palsgraf, in
TORTS STORIES 129, 132 (Robert L. Rabin & Stephen D. Sugarman eds., 2003).
106 See KEETON ET AL., supra note 103, § 41, at 264 (noting that “the consequences of an act
go forward to eternity, and the causes of an event go back to the dawn of human events, and beyond,” so that the lack of a limiting rule “would result in infinite liability for all wrongful acts”).
107 See id. § 4, at 25–26.
108 For an elaboration of this idea, see Mark F. Grady, Proximate Cause and the Law of Negligence, 69 IOWA L. REV. 363, 385–91 (1984); and Benjamin C. Zipursky, Rights, Wrongs, and Recourse in the Law of Torts, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1, 46–47 (1998).
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not factor them into their risk-creating activities.109 Allowing recovery
for them would result in a costly transfer payment rather than a beneficial allocative effect.110 Negligence law therefore eliminates unforeseeable consequences from the calculus. This omission is attributed to
the limitations inherent in human predictive capabilities, which in turn
derive from the prohibitive costs associated with the process of acquiring information about these events. Foreseeability thus ensures that a
defendant is expected neither to have perfect information nor to remain perfectly ignorant, but instead to be in possession of the amount
of information that he is capable of possessing and is likely to use.111
2. Contract Law: Consequential Damages and Impossibility. —
Contract law employs foreseeability in two unrelated contexts: consequential damages and the doctrine of impossibility of performance. Its
basis for doing so remains the same in each context.
Consequential damages are understood as damages for those losses
that arise not directly from the party’s breach, but rather as an indirect consequence of it.112 As a matter of rule, courts limit consequential damages to those losses that were capable of being “in the contemplation of both parties, at the time they made the contract, as the
probable result of the breach of it.”113 Consequential losses are thus
recoverable only if they were foreseeable to both parties when the contract was actually made.114
The idea here is that unless a party is made aware of grounds for
liability beyond direct losses, that party is unlikely to have bargained
for such liability, and consequently, the consideration underlying the
contract is unlikely to reflect the additional risk involved. Since liability in contract law is meant to be tied to the actual bargain — the basis of the contract — courts look to foreseeability at the time of the
bargain. Unless a contracting party was likely to have foreseen a consequence, she is unlikely to have assumed the risk for it as part of the
bargain.
Additionally, contract law exempts one or both parties from performance of the contract when an unanticipated supervening event

–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
109 See WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
TORT LAW 246–47 (1987); Grady, supra note 108, at 388; Steven Shavell, Liability and the Incentive To Obtain Information About Risk, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 259 (1992).
110 See LANDES & POSNER, supra note 109, at 247.
111 Grady, supra note 108, at 388–89.
112 See Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Principle of Hadley v. Baxendale, 80 CAL. L. REV. 563,
565 (1992).
113 Hadley v. Baxendale, 9 Ex. 341, 156 Eng. Rep. 145, 151 (1854).
114 See Jeffrey M. Perloff, Breach of Contract and the Foreseeability Doctrine of Hadley v.
Baxendale, 10 J. LEGAL STUD. 39 (1981).
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renders performance impossible or commercially impracticable.115
Courts here often employ the test of foreseeability to determine (objectively) whether an event was capable of being anticipated in order to
excuse nonperformance.116 The foreseeability test thus holds a party
to “the terms of a contract unless her performance is rendered impracticable by an event that was unforeseeable at the time the contract was
made.”117 The idea here is that it is unobjectionable to have parties
incur losses (as a result of nonperformance) arising from consequences
they ought to have foreseen and are therefore deemed to have been
compensated for.118 Central to the idea is the proposition that unforeseeable risks are unlikely to have formed any part of the contractual
bargain, whereas foreseeable ones are likely to have played such a role.
Here, unsurprisingly, scholars have long tied the law’s use of foreseeability to its reliance on limited information processing by individuals
under conditions of predictive uncertainty (that is, bounded rationality,
in the organizational context).119 The law remains reluctant to allow
recovery for eventualities and risks that parties are unlikely to have foreseen when entering into a contract.120

–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
115 For more on the doctrine and its development, see William Herbert Page, The Development
of the Doctrine of Impossibility of Performance, 18 MICH. L. REV. 589 (1920); Michelle J. White,
Contract Breach and Contract Discharge Due to Impossibility: A Unified Theory, 17 J. LEGAL
STUD. 353 (1988); John D. Wladis, Common Law and Uncommon Events: The Development of the
Doctrine of Impossibility of Performance in English Contract Law, 75 GEO. L.J. 1575 (1987); and
John D. Wladis, Impracticability As Risk Allocation: The Effect of Changed Circumstances upon
Contract Obligations for the Sale of Goods, 22 GA. L. REV. 503 (1988).
116 See, e.g., Waldinger Corp. v. CRS Group Eng’rs, Inc., 775 F.2d 781 (7th Cir. 1985); Lloyd v.
Murphy, 153 P.2d 47 (Cal. 1944); Farm Credit Bank of St. Louis v. Dorr, 620 N.E.2d 549, 555–56
(Ill. App. Ct. 1993); City of Starkville v. 4-County Elec. Power Ass’n, 819 So.2d 1216, 1223 (Miss.
2002); Alamance County Bd. of Educ. v. Bobby Murray Chevrolet, Inc., 465 S.E.2d 306, 311
(N.C. Ct. App. 1996); Grady v. Grady, 504 A.2d 444, 447 (R.I. 1986); see also E. Allan Farnsworth,
Disputes Over Omission in Contracts, 68 COLUM. L. REV. 860 (1968); Mary Sue Bloomfield,
Comment, The Role of Foreseeability in Allocation of Risk Under U.C.C. 2-615, Excuse by Failure of Presupposed Conditions, 21 S. TEX. L.J. 441 (1981); Charles G. Brown, Note, The Doctrine
of Impossibility of Performance and the Foreseeability Test, 6 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 575 (1975). This
test came to be codified in the Uniform Commercial Code. See U.C.C. § 2-615 (2003).
117 John Elofson, The Dilemma of Changed Circumstances in Contract Law: An Economic
Analysis of the Foreseeability and Superior Risk Bearer Tests, 30 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 1,
4 (1996).
118 Id.
119 See Joskow, supra note 100, at 157 (“The foreseeability requirement may only make sense if
we introduce the concept of ‘bounded rationality.’”); see also Shirley R. Brener, Comment, Outgrowing Impossibility: Examining the Impossibility Doctrine in the Wake of Hurricane Katrina,
56 EMORY L.J. 461, 469, 477–80 (2006); Aaron J. Wright, Note, Rendered Impracticable: Behavioral Economics and the Impracticability Doctrine, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 2183, 2200 (2005).
120 See Joskow, supra note 100, at 157.
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3. Family Law: Premarital Agreements. — Courts often treat premarital agreements very differently from other contracts.121 When it
comes to enforcing them, courts routinely examine their actual content
for substantive fairness.122 As part of this process they often use a foreseeability test, which asks whether the situation upon divorce seems
to be one that the parties could have anticipated when they entered into the agreement.123 In situations where parties’ circumstances have
changed since the agreement was entered into, courts remain reluctant
to enforce the agreement.124
In many ways the test operates in the exact same way as the doctrine of impossibility, except that foreseeability of the event is now a
condition precedent to enforcement, rather than nonenforcement. The
driving idea is again that individuals make incomplete predictions —
that is, that there exists a limit to the changes to their situations that
parties are likely to have contemplated prior to their marriage.125
4. Property Law: Coming to the Nuisance. — Premised on the
principle of temporal priority, the doctrine of coming to the nuisance is
used to preclude nuisance actions by plaintiffs who move to a location
where a defendant’s activities have been going on well before their
move.126
As part of this inquiry, to determine whether a plaintiff should
have been aware of the defendant’s prior activities when moving,
courts often use a test of foreseeability. They ask if the injury being
complained of was foreseeable to the plaintiff at the time of
the move, and if answered in the affirmative, weigh this finding
against the plaintiff.127 Even in situations where the defendant’s actions were subsequent to the plaintiff’s move, courts disallow the nuisance action when the defendant’s activities were unambiguously im–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
121 See generally UNIF. PREMARITAL AGREEMENT ACT § 1(1), 9C U.L.A. 39 (1983); 2 ALEXANDER LINDEY & LOUIS I. PARLEY, LINDEY AND PARLEY ON SEPARATION AGREEMENTS AND ANTENUPTIAL CONTRACTS § 110.70(2)(d) (2d ed. 2002).
122 See Allison A. Marston, Note, Planning for Love: The Politics of Prenuptial Agreements, 49

STAN. L. REV. 887, 897–901 (1997).
123 See Karen Servidea, Note, Reviewing Premarital Agreements To Protect the State’s Interest
in Marriage, 91 VA. L. REV. 535, 545 (2005).
124 See, e.g., McKee-Johnson v. Johnson, 444 N.W.2d 259, 267 (Minn. 1989); Gant v. Gant, 329
S.E.2d 106, 115 (W. Va. 1985); Button v. Button, 388 N.W.2d 546, 552 (Wis. 1986).
125 See Servidea, supra note 123, at 547, 549 (referring to this approach as the “boundedrationality” approach).
126 For more on the doctrine, see Roy E. Cordato, Time Passage and the Economics of Coming
to the Nuisance: Reassessing the Coasean Perspective, 20 CAMPBELL L. REV. 273 (1998); Rohan
Pitchford & Christopher M. Snyder, Coming to the Nuisance: An Economic Analysis from an Incomplete Contracts Perspective, 19 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 491 (2003); and Donald Wittman, First
Come, First Served: An Economic Analysis of “Coming to the Nuisance,” 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 557
(1980).
127 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 840D (1979) (noting that the preexistence of
the nuisance is but one of several factors to be considered, and not by itself a bar to relief).
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minent — or, reasonably foreseeable.128 This often comes into play in
situations where the precise nuisance complained of originated after
the plaintiff’s move, but where the general category of activities (of
which the defendant’s nuisance was but one) was known to be in the
vicinity.129
As with other areas of law discussed, the operating idea here is that
reasonably foreseeable consequences ought to be part of an individual’s motives for action, while unforeseeable ones simply are not.
Consequently, limiting liability for foreseeable nuisances is meant to
create an ex ante effect on individuals’ moving decisions by forcing
them to factor the possibility of such nuisances into their decisions.
5. Patent Law: Prosecution History Estoppel. — In patent law, the
doctrine of equivalents allows courts in infringement actions to look
beyond a patent’s exact claims and to enjoin as part of the patent’s exclusivity “unimportant and insubstantial changes”130 that do nothing
more than take a defendant’s actions outside the terms of a patent’s
literal coverage.131 The rule of prosecution history estoppel in turn
places a limit on a patentee’s use of the doctrine of equivalents. It applies when a patentee surrenders or narrows a claim during the prosecution process.132 The rule then operates as a rule of abandonment,
barring the patentee “from later invoking the doctrine of equivalents to
recapture the lost ground.”133
In determining how much a patentee surrenders each time a claim
is modified, courts have recently come to use foreseeability to differentiate between abandoned and unabandoned equivalents.134 As used
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
128 See Wittman, supra note 126, at 565. The case of East St. John’s Shingle Co. v. City of
Portland, 246 P.2d 554 (Or. 1952), is illustrative. There, the plaintiff acquired a parcel of land
adjoining a slough that was being polluted by the city’s sewage system. After moving onto the
land, the plaintiff complained that an increase in sewage levels in the slough was interfering with
its business and causing a special nuisance to it. The court concluded that since the pollution, its
continuance, and its increase were all “reasonably foreseen” by the plaintiff, the claim was barred.
Id. at 563–64.
129 See Bove v. Donner-Hanna Coke Corp., 258 N.Y.S. 229, 233 (App. Div. 1932); Gau v. Ley,
38 Ohio Ct. App. 235, 239 (1916); Wittman, supra note 126, at 565 n.20.
130 Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 607 (1950).
131 See id. at 607–08.
132 See Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 30–31 (1997).
133 Douglas Lichtman, Rethinking Prosecution History Estoppel, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 151, 153
(2004).
134 For early analyses of this trend, see Matthew J. Conigliaro et al., Foreseeability in Patent
Law, 16 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1045 (2001); and Andrew C. Greenberg & Jeffrey R. Kuester,
The “Palsgraffing” of Patent Law: Foreseeability and the Doctrine of Equivalents, INTELL. PROP.
TODAY, June 1998, at 17. See also Sage Prods., Inc. v. Devon Indus., Inc., 126 F.3d 1420 (Fed.
Cir. 1997); Michael J. Meurer & Craig Allen Nard, Invention, Refinement and Patent Claim
Scope: A New Perspective on the Doctrine of Equivalents, 93 GEO. L.J. 1947, 1970 (2005). The
test was adopted by the Supreme Court in Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co.,
535 U.S. 722 (2002).
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now, the rule allows patentees to use the doctrine of equivalents to
claim equivalents that were unforeseeable to them when they narrowed their claims, but not those that were foreseeable.135 The rationale is that when a patentee could not have foreseen an equivalent, he is
unlikely to have abandoned it, whereas a foreseeable equivalent may
be deemed consciously abandoned unless expressly claimed. Unforeseeable equivalents are thus unlikely to have been factored into the
claim drafting process.
B. Foreseeability and Limits to Behavioral Modification
In each of the areas discussed above, foreseeability performs a similar function. Courts attempt to reconstruct actors’ decisionmaking at
the time of the triggering event — that is, the event that triggers either
the liability or the entitlement. In so doing, courts use foreseeability,
either directly or through the test of reasonable foreseeability, to eliminate from the reconstruction certain low-probability outcomes that are
unlikely to have formed a significant part of the decisionmaking process. As a functional matter, then, foreseeability limits the behavioral
modification that the law expects to induce among actors.
Additionally, foreseeability as used in these different areas of the
law entails both a descriptive and a normative dimension. Its descriptive side derives from a belief about human behavior: that individuals
do not ordinarily consider events and outcomes of low probability in
making decisions. Consequently, the law does not expect its system of
incentives and deterrents to extend to these events and outcomes. Its
liability structure focuses exclusively on events likely to have formed
part of an actor’s deliberations and thus capable of legitimate attribution to that actor during the cost-benefit allocation process. In a sense,
this descriptive dimension follows from the law’s concern with windfalls. Allocating the costs and benefits arising from events that individuals were incapable of anticipating ex ante (and therefore avoiding
and inducing, respectively) remains incongruent with the idea of ex
post liability as a system of outcome responsibility.136 Thus, holding a
defendant liable only for harms that objectively could have been anticipated and deeming a patentee to have abandoned only variations of
a patent’s claims during the drafting process that could have been pre–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
135 See Festo, 535 U.S. at 738; Lichtman, supra note 133, at 154; Richard Warburg et al., What
Territory Is Surrendered?, 21 BIOTECH. L. REP. 551, 552 (2002).
136 Outcome responsibility argues that liability does no more than attribute legal responsibility
for specific outcomes to identifiable individuals, as a reflection of the law’s basic commitment to
human agency and moral authorship of individual actions. See John Gardner, Obligations and
Outcomes in the Law of Torts, in RELATING TO RESPONSIBILITY: ESSAYS FOR TONY
HONORÉ ON HIS EIGHTIETH BIRTHDAY 111 (Peter Cane & John Gardner eds., 2001); Tony
Honoré, Responsibility and Luck, 104 LAW Q. REV. 530 (1988).
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dicted both derive from a common belief that the attribution of outcomes to individuals should conform to the way in which individuals
ordinarily perceive the world.137
Foreseeability’s normative side, on the other hand, relates to the
law’s forward-looking (or ex ante) function. Here, foreseeability tempers the law’s model of inducements for future actors by making an
entitlement or liability contingent on something being either foreseeable or unforeseeable. It thus encourages actors to acquire, disclose, or
limit their information gathering by reference to the foreseeability limit. The descriptive and normative aspects almost always go together,
for the latter derives from the former. Nonetheless, bifurcating the
two helps shed light on the interaction between foreseeability and the
law’s incentive structure in each setting.
Foreseeability thus attempts to balance the law’s ex ante and ex
post effects. Certain low-probability outcomes are thought incapable
of playing a significant role in inducing ex ante behavior; when allocating the costs or benefits associated with them one way or the other is
thought to produce inefficiencies ex post, foreseeability allows courts to
disregard them during the calculus. The table that follows attempts to
separate the descriptive and normative roles that foreseeability plays
in each of the contexts discussed in section A. What it shows is that in
each setting foreseeability shapes the law’s liability or attribution
structure, and at the same time influences individual behavior to conform to the law.
Thus, in different areas of the common law, foreseeability ably instantiates the idea that individuals have limited predictive capabilities
that in turn influence their decisionmaking. It does so in recognition
of the law’s objective of influencing future behavior among actors and
eliminating socially inefficient windfall gains and losses.

–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
137 Professor Stephen Perry, a well-known proponent of outcome responsibility, connects this to
the idea of “avoidability” — that liability should be limited to events and outcomes that might in a
sense be considered avoidable ex ante. Avoidability, for Perry, involves an agent having the “ability and opportunity to take steps” to avoid the harm “on the basis of what could have been foreseen.” Stephen R. Perry, Responsibility for Outcomes, Risk, and the Law of Torts, in PHILOSOPHY AND THE LAW OF TORTS 72, 91 (Gerald J. Postema ed., 2001). Foreseeability thus plays a
major role here, based on the notion of “epistemic probability” — or the idea that individuals base
their decisions not on objective assessments of probability, but rather on intersubjective standards
of inductive reasoning. Id. at 97–98. To impose liability for (that is, to have people internalize the
costs or benefits of) events that were not objectively avoidable then becomes a matter of chance,
or a windfall, since it bears no connection to the actor’s actual behavior.
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TABLE 1. FORESEEABILITY AS A DESCRIPTIVE
AND NORMATIVE LIMIT

TORT LAW:
NEGLIGENCE

CONTRACT LAW:
CONSEQUENTIAL
DAMAGES

CONTRACT LAW:
IMPOSSIBILITY

PREMARITAL
AGREEMENTS

COMING TO THE
NUISANCE

PROSECUTION
HISTORY
ESTOPPEL

FORESEEABILITY
RULE & POINT
OF INQUIRY
Defendant’s liability limited to harm
reasonably foreseeable at the time of
action.
Consequential
damages limited to
losses reasonably
foreseeable to parties at the time of
contracting.

DESCRIPTIVE
DIMENSION
(EX POST)
Unforeseeable consequences (harms)
unlikely to have
been part of the
decision to act.
Unforeseeable
losses unlikely to
have formed part
of the consideration
bargained for.

Performance rendered impossible
only if triggering
event unforeseeable at the time of
contracting.

Unforeseeable contingencies unlikely
to be allocated in
the contractual
consideration.

Agreement enforceable only if
state of affairs reasonably foreseeable
at the time of
agreement.
Nuisance action
disallowed if injury foreseeable at
the time of
relocation.

Unforeseeable contingencies unlikely
to have been factored into the terms
of the agreement.

Reasonably foreseeable equivalents
deemed abandoned during the
patent prosecution
process.

Unforeseeable
equivalents
unlikely to have
been anticipated
and therefore
abandoned.

Possibility of unforeseeable injury
unlikely to have
been any part of
the decision to
relocate.

NORMATIVE
DIMENSION
(EX ANTE)
Actors should take
precautions only
against predictable
(causally connected)
harms.
Parties with special
information about
the possibility of
objectively unpredictable losses encouraged to disclose
it.
Risks tied to predictable interferences with performance ought to
be allocated in
the contractual
bargain.
Agreement ought to
best reflect parties’
predictions of their
situation at the time
of divorce.
At the time of relocation, a party
ought to determine
the nature of the
locality and predictable events
there.
Patentees ought to
pay close attention
to predictable variants of abandoned
claims during the
prosecution process.
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IV. FORESEEABILITY IN COPYRIGHT LAW
What might copyright law look like if a test of foreseeability were
introduced into its infringement inquiry as a mechanism by which to
eliminate any unincentivized benefits (that is, windfalls), thereby balancing the system’s ex ante incentive effects against its ex post social
costs? This Part attempts to answer that question by proposing a new
test of “foreseeable copying” that would require a plaintiff to establish
that the defendant’s copying was objectively foreseeable at the time of
creation — the point at which copyright’s incentive structure is meant
to have influenced a creator’s behavior. It would thus place the burden on a plaintiff to establish, in addition to actual copying and substantial similarity, that the defendant’s copying was of a form and for a
purpose foreseeable to a reasonable, informed creator at the time when
the work was created. The test would thus operate as part of the entitlement delineation process, rather than as an exception to it (unlike
fair use), thereby forcing courts to structure copyright’s grant of exclusivity by reference to the outer bounds of a creator’s incentive. Thus,
in situations where a defendant’s form of copying (or use) was not
known, in existence, or capable of being anticipated at the time the
work was created, the test would limit a plaintiff’s claim by acknowledging that the creator’s control over this new use (or copying) could
not have formed a necessary part of the creator’s set of incentives in
creating it. This Part outlines in greater detail the shape this test
might take.
A. The Foreseeability Limit
If the law is willing to assume in other areas that unforeseeable
events are not motivational concerns, it would seem inconsistent with
this basic premise to have a system of copyright that assumes otherwise. Unforeseeable uses are unlikely to be part of a creator’s inducement to create in exactly the same way that unforeseeable consequences are unlikely to be part of an individual’s decision whether to
act. A test of “foreseeable copying” would operationalize this idea.
In the abstract, foreseeability may appear to be an unworkable idea
— one that is likely to either prove indeterminate in practice or interfere significantly with creators’ incentives. Gordon, one of the earliest
to consider its applicability to copyright, rejects it as a useful device in
copyright law, observing that it is likely to present “intractable proof
problems” and “dilute economic incentives.”138 This treatment ignores
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
138 Wendy J. Gordon, On Owning Information: Intellectual Property and the Restitutionary
Impulse, 78 VA. L. REV. 149, 238 & n.337 (1992) [hereinafter Gordon, On Owning Information].
Gordon does not specify what foreseeability might indeed come to mean in the copyright context
(specifically given its use elsewhere) and seems to equate foreseeability with the idea of “expected
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altogether the nuance with which foreseeability has come to be routinely used as an objective indicator in a host of other areas, and more
importantly, the basic idea underlying its use in different contexts: the
existence of an outer limit to any expected behavioral modification.
1. Copyright’s Theory of Foreseeability: “Foreseeable Copying.” —
Under the current law, copyright protection begins the moment a work
is created, with creation being defined as the point when a work, eligible for protection, is fixed in a tangible medium for the first time.139
Protection is automatic, with there being no obligation on the creator
to comply with any formalities as a prerequisite for protection. The
law grants the creator a finite set of exclusive rights in relation to the
work and allows the creator to initiate an action for infringement
when someone interferes with one of those rights.140
When the creator (plaintiff) commences an action for infringement
against a defendant, the law places the burden on the plaintiff to establish two main elements: (1) ownership of a valid copyright and (2)
copying by the defendant of the original (that is, protected) elements.141 To establish ownership, the plaintiff usually has to establish
that the work is entitled to protection per the statutory requirements
and that he is the valid owner of the rights in it.142 However, the law
requires that the work be registered with the Copyright Office before
an action for infringement is brought, and this registration serves as
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
markets,” thereby converting it into a subjective test, specific to individual creators. Gordon, supra note 14, at 1385 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also id. at 1385 nn.192–93; Gordon,
On Owning Information, supra, at 238 n.337. She does note, however, that the idea is “perhaps
desirable in the abstract” since new markets might be irrelevant to creative incentives. Id. at 238.
Interestingly, Gordon recognizes in her later work that the idea of foreseeability as used in tort
law does represent an outer limit to incentives. However, she argues that copyright’s limited term
gives effect to this limit independently, seemingly obviating the need for its independent incorporation into copyright doctrine. See Wendy J. Gordon, Copyright As Tort Law’s Mirror Image:
“Harms,” “Benefits,” and the Uses and Limits of Analogy, 34 MCGEORGE L. REV. 533, 538–39
(2003).
In a similar vein, Landes and Posner note that eliminating “unforeseen” markets from the
copyright entitlement is likely to dampen creator incentives since an incentive ordinarily extends
to a “class of markets.” William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Indefinitely Renewable Copyright, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 471, 476 n.14 (2003). It would appear that an objective (as opposed to
subjective) foreseeability test would function precisely in this manner, allowing a creator to capture not just present markets, but also those cognately related to them. See Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Rethinking Copyright: Property Through the Lenses of Unjust Enrichment and Unfair Competition, 156 U. PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 345, 349–50 & n.23 (2008), http://www.pennumbra.
com/responses/01-2008/Balganesh.pdf; see also Christina Bohannan, Copyright Harm, Foreseeability, and Fair Use, 85 WASH. U. L. REV. 969, 973–74 (2007) (using the idea indirectly in arguing that the fair use analysis should focus on the occurrence or absence of “copyright harm” to the
plaintiff).
139 See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006).
140 Id. §§ 106, 501.
141 See 4 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 42, § 13.01, at 13-4 to -5.
142 See id. § 13.01[A], at 13-6 to -7.
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prima facie evidence of ownership and satisfaction of the statutory
prerequisites for protection.143 Consequently, during infringement actions courts focus on the second of the two elements: copying.
Since the question of copying is not entirely factual, a plaintiff
needs to convince a court not just that the defendant appropriated
part of his work, but also that the portion appropriated is protectible
as such.144 This is done using the substantial similarity requirement,
discussed previously. After this, the requirement of foreseeability
would have courts go one step further and require the plaintiff to show
not just factual and wrongful copying, but additionally foreseeable
copying.
Foreseeability would thus operate as a third element in the determination of copying. The requirement of “foreseeable copying” would
ask whether the defendant’s use (that is, copying) of the protected work
was foreseeable to the plaintiff — in form and purpose — when the
work was created. It is critical to note that the question posed is one of
foreseeability and not foresight. It is not relevant whether the plaintiff
actually foresaw the defendant’s form of copying; it only matters that
the copying was foreseeable, in light of the information available to
him at the stage of creation. In addition, by focusing the inquiry on
the point of creation (and not after), it minimizes the effect of hindsight
bias on the inquiry.145
It is worth emphasizing that the foreseeability here relates to the
form and purpose of the defendant’s copying and not to other factors,
such as its magnitude or monetary consequences. In some ways this
aspect of the test would track tort law’s rule on “eggshell skull” plaintiffs, where a defendant is not allowed to argue that the magnitude or
extent of the harm or loss suffered by the plaintiff was not foreseeable
because it depended on attributes specific to the plaintiff, such as a
preexistent medical condition.146 Thus, if harm was a foreseeable consequence of the defendant’s actions, it matters little that the plaintiff
was an ailing old woman, rather than a teenager in perfect health. In
a similar vein, it should matter little to the foreseeability determination
that the defendant copied the entire book, or made a million copies of
it, rather than a few. Foreseeability in copyright, under the test, would
ignore magnitude.

–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
143
144
145

17 U.S.C. §§ 410(c), 411.
4 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 42, § 13.01[B], at 13-8 to -9.
Hindsight bias is a phenomenon that many scholars argue influences the infringement question in all of intellectual property law. See infra section V.D., pp. 1630–32.
146 See Benn v. Thomas, 512 N.W.2d 537 (Iowa 1994); Vosberg v. Putney, 47 N.W. 99 (Wis.
1890).
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In this formulation, foreseeability would focus on the defendant’s
actions (that is, the copying), rather than function as an open-ended
device that courts might then connect to the notions of “harm” or
“market.” Any reliance on these ideas as independent concepts, even
when prefaced by the question of foreseeability (that is, as “foreseeable
harm” or “foreseeable market”), will inevitably depend on a set of firstorder assumptions that need to be justified on their own.147 Questions
of appropriate baselines, market substitutability, remoteness, and the
like enter the equation as independent variables with the result that
the inquiry begins to focus less on the creator’s incentive at the time of
creation and more on these other elements.148 “Foreseeable copying,”
on the other hand, obviates any reliance on first-order assumptions
and connects foreseeability as a behavioral device with the act of copying that is always at the core of an infringement dispute.
Given that copying in one form or another is central to every action
for infringement, the test of foreseeability would operate regardless of
which exclusive right the plaintiff alleges the defendant to have infringed. Thus, in most situations where substantial similarity is easily
satisfied, the foreseeability test would be, too. But in situations where
the defendant’s copying is a consequence of an innovative use that
does not owe its existence to the creator, foreseeability begins to play a
significant role. Thus, uses such as the Google Library Project149 that
employ prior works in a new way are likely to satisfy the substantial
similarity test; whether they constitute copying would then depend on
the plaintiff’s ability to establish that the use was within the realm of
foreseeable uses when the work was created. The same would be the
case for uses involving new media such as cable television, home recording, or the digitization of music.
Under current doctrine, questions of this nature are relegated to the
fair use inquiry. Given that fair use is an affirmative defense, the burden then falls to the defendant to show how his actions (of copying)
were not harmful to the plaintiff.150 It places the entire focus on the
defendant, glossing over the uses that the plaintiff might have legitimately expected to control in creating the work. Foreseeable copying
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
147 See, e.g., Bohannan, supra note 138, at 1003 (attempting to understand copyright harm as
“foreseeable harm”). Professor Christina Bohannan seems to implicitly connect the idea to inferences of market substitutability. As a consequence, foreseeability ceases to function as an independent behavioral limit, since unforeseeable uses in her model could still form part of the entitlement upon an independent showing of substitution. See id. at 989.
148 For a useful discussion of some of these ideas as applied to copyright, see Wendy J. Gordon,
Of Harms and Benefits: Torts, Restitution, and Intellectual Property, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 449
(1992).
149 See Band, supra note 66, at 6.
150 3 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 42, § 12.11[F].
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shifts the burden onto the plaintiff to establish this point as part of the
infringement inquiry.
Foreseeable copying would thus function as an objective proxy for
a creator’s anticipated markets. Yet it relies on copyright’s bipolar
(that is, private law) structure as a pivot around which to construct
those markets. It would in a sense function analogously to antitrust
law’s “relevant market” determination, where courts attempt to construct the outer bounds of a notional market for a good or service in
order to assess an entity’s influence therein.151 The process there is
both factual and normative, with the determination often expressly informed by antitrust law’s goals and objectives.152 In a similar vein,
foreseeable copying would have courts undertake a nearly identical reconstruction of the notional market, but now by reference to copyright’s purpose: inducing creativity. It would draw attention to the
centrality of identifying a probability distribution of future markets at
the time of creation, in order to eliminate those that were unlikely to
have formed a necessary part of a creator’s set of future markets that
together constituted the incentive.
The elements of form and purpose that make up the test in turn
connect to two central determinants of future market structure in the
copyright context: technology and use. One could thus posit four possible configurations based on these indicators. In the first, both use
and technology are foreseeable; in the second, neither is; in the third,
use is foreseeable while technology is not; and finally in the fourth,
vice versa. The first situation represents those markets that were
clearly within a creator’s objectively anticipated revenue streams for
the work. The second, by contrast, represents markets that are truly
stochastic and therefore incapable of being anticipated in any sense.
In the third and fourth configurations, however, the interaction between form and purpose (that is, technology and use) becomes crucial.
Where a change in either form or purpose is independently significant
enough that it impacts the other (that is, purpose or form, respectively)
so as to alter the structure of the market, one might posit that the
market as a whole was unforeseeable. Yet in other situations where
the unforeseeability is solely either of use or technology and is selfcontained, the market might be classified as foreseeable.153 For exam–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
151 See generally Robert G. Harris & Thomas M. Jorde, Antitrust Market Definition: An Integrated Approach, 72 CAL. L. REV. 1 (1984); William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Market
Power in Antitrust Cases, 94 HARV. L. REV. 937 (1981).
152 See Harris & Jorde, supra note 151, at 18–19.
153 This might be graphically represented by the following table:
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ple, the mere transition to a newer, more efficient technology (for example, Blu-ray from DVDs) would fit the latter category, for the technology may have been unforeseeable yet it is likely to have little impact on the structure of the market and the use to which the creative
work is put. By contrast, the move from broadcast television to VCRs,
though principally a technological development, reoriented the market
and uses therein — through the idea of time-shiftable home viewership
— and would, under the test, come out as unforeseeable.
The distinction between these last two situations is particularly important because it allows the test to be mapped onto a concern often
voiced in the copyright context — namely, that of market substitution.
If a new technology (and the market it creates) has the effect of replacing the demand for the creative work in existent markets, should not
that harm be accounted for by the copyright system? While harm
from substitution certainly is not copyright’s core concern, to the extent that it is likely to impact a creator’s ex ante incentive (that is,
where a substitute was foreseeable), it certainly ought to remain a relevant consideration. Foreseeable copying, through its use of form and
purpose as indicators, allows for this by differentiating between markets that are primarily a result of demand diversion and those that
arise largely out of the creation of new demand.154 The latter includes
markets dependent largely on consumers who were not previously
buying the work, while the former includes markets that rely on diverting customers away from existent markets.155 Future markets that
are structurally different in form and purpose from existent ones —
that is, markets for unforeseeable uses — are likely to derive largely
from the creation of new demand rather than from cannibalizing exis–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
FORESEEABLE FORM
(TECHNOLOGY)
UNFORESEEABLE FORM
(TECHNOLOGY)

FORESEEABLE
PURPOSE (USE)
Scenario 1
(F, F)
Scenario 3
(U, F)

UNFORESEEABLE
PURPOSE (USE)
Scenario 4
(F, U)
Scenario 2
(U, U)

It is also perhaps worth mentioning that situations in Scenario 4 typically are also the subject of
the transformative use defense under current fair use law. See supra pp. 1585–86. The foreseeable copying test would not replace transformative use, but would posit a preliminary question:
whether the creator’s entitlement extends to the market for the transformation to begin with (in
simple terms, a question of whether the specific market for that transformation was foreseeable).
Only if the question is answered in the affirmative would the foreseeable copying test allow the
transformative use defense to proceed to a social welfare analysis to decide whether to find the
existence of infringement or exempt the action as independently creative. Thanks to Adam
Badawi and Arden Rowell for discussions that resulted in this table.
154 Harm from market substitution derives largely (if not entirely) from demand diversion,
making this distinction very relevant. See Christopher S. Yoo, Copyright and Product Differentiation, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 212, 272 (2004) (noting the connection between the two).
155 Id. at 260.
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tent demand, thereby allowing the concern with substitutability to be
given some salience in the entitlement structuring process. To give the
concern with substitutability any more significance than this (for example, by attempting to control for all substitutes, not just foreseeable
ones) would collapse the system back into its current state, devoid of
any connection to incentives and the probability distribution that is
central to them.
2. Working Foreseeable Copying. — Does the theory of foreseeability, as contained in the “foreseeable copying” test, actually present
courts with a workable basis on which to construe copyright’s grant of
exclusivity? In other words, is it likely to complicate copyright law by
introducing an altogether new conceptual device, the use of which
would entail additional costs?
Interestingly enough, the idea of foreseeability is not completely
alien to copyright law and its treatment of new uses. It remains
somewhat common for courts to use the idea in construing the scope of
rights granted by a licensor to the licensee under a license for the
work.156 Its use in that context is likely to provide courts with a directly relevant way in which to operationalize the test, making the
transition to the new approach much simpler than one might imagine.
Foreseeability in the licensing context can be traced back to Judge
Friendly, whose opinion in Bartsch v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc.157
used foreseeability to determine whether an assignment of motion picture rights included the right to telecast a copyrighted work. Observing that knowledgeable people knew of television’s potential at the
time that the license was entered into, the court concluded that the licensor had “reason to know” of the new technology and was therefore
deemed to have included it in the grant.158 In Bartsch, the district
court had relied on expert testimony to the effect that “[t]he processes
of theatre and home television exhibition [were] markedly similar”159
from both commercial and technical perspectives in the industry when
the contract was entered into — thirty-seven years prior to the actual
litigation.160 The Second Circuit endorsed this approach to construing
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
156 See Sidney A. Rosenzweig, Comment, Don’t Put My Article Online!: Extending Copyright’s
New-Use Doctrine to the Electronic Publishing Media and Beyond, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 899, 915
(1995) (“In determining whether the new technology falls within the scope of the explicitly granted
or preexisting technology, courts examine the foreseeability of the new medium.”).
157 391 F.2d 150 (2d Cir. 1968). For a more recent application of the doctrine, see Boosey &
Hawkes Music Publishers, Ltd. v. Walt Disney Co., 145 F.3d 481, 486 (2d Cir. 1998).
158 Bartsch, 391 F.2d at 154 (finding that the law “will not charge a grantor with the duty of
expressly saving [some] rights when he could not know of the invention’s existence” and finding
“no case holding that an experienced businessman” is “not bound by the natural implications of
the language he accepted when he had reason to know of the new medium’s potential”).
159 Bartsch v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 270 F. Supp. 896, 900 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
160 Id. at 900–01.
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the license, concluding that the work’s use in the context of a telecast
was therefore plainly foreseeable.161 As a seemingly natural corollary,
in situations where the technology or use in question was not publicly
known at the time that the license was entered into, or where circumstances imply that there exists no reasonable basis on which to impute
knowledge of the same to the licensor at the time of the licensing,
courts construe the grant narrowly to exclude the new use in dispute
from its scope.162
The logic for this attempt to limit the grant resonates with foreseeability’s use as a bounded rationality–driven device. Thus, one court
noted that a new use may need to be excluded from the contractual
grant when it “was completely unforeseeable and therefore could not
possibly have formed part of the bargain between the parties at the
time of the original grant.”163 Since contract law is concerned with
linking liability for breach with parties’ intent in entering into the contract, factors and possibilities that could not have possibly formed part
of this intent are excluded, and liability is correspondingly limited. As
a matter of contract law, this approach appears reasonable and perfectly logical, given contract law’s focus on the parties’ “bargain.”164
All the same, the approach is also often justified in noncontractual
terms as deriving from the need to avoid giving one party an unjustified windfall. In explaining this rationale, one court has noted that the
foreseeability test prevents the licensee from reaping “the entire windfall” associated with the unforeseen use.165 Allowing a licensee to benefit from exogenous technological developments that were not part of
the bargain is deemed a windfall and perhaps rightly so. But why
then is not the licensor’s (that is, creator’s) benefiting from similar exogenous developments a windfall too? In other words, why should the
unforeseeable use not remain outside the reach of the original copyright grant to begin with?
Foreseeability is thus used to limit a licensee’s copyright grant but
not the licensor’s original one, which remains somewhat of an anomaly
— especially given that over the years courts have developed tools by
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
161
162

Bartsch, 391 F.2d at 154.
For different approaches to this corollary, see, for example, Rey v. Lafferty, 990 F.2d 1379,
1388 (1st Cir. 1993); Cohen v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 845 F.2d 851, 854 (9th Cir. 1988);
ABKCO Music, Inc. v. Westminster Music, Ltd., 838 F. Supp. 153, 156 (S.D.N.Y. 1993); Platinum
Record Co. v. Lucasfilm, Ltd., 566 F. Supp. 226, 227 (D.N.J. 1983); and Kirke La Shelle Co. v.
Paul Armstrong Co., 188 N.E. 163, 165–66 (N.Y. 1933).
163 Rey, 990 F.2d at 1388 (citing Cohen, 845 F.2d at 854; Kirke La Shelle Co., 188 N.E. at 163).
164 See Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Bargain Principle and Its Limits, 95 HARV. L. REV. 741
(1982); cf. Rosenzweig, supra note 156, at 917 (noting that the open-ended nature of the analysis
allows courts to “manipulate” the determination).
165 Cohen, 845 F.2d at 854 (quoting Neil R. Nagano, Comment, Past Copyright Licenses and
the New Video Software Medium, 29 UCLA L. REV. 1160, 1184 (1982)) (internal quotation mark
omitted).
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which to answer the retrospective inquiry in the contractual context.
They look to popular media, trade journals, expert testimony, industry
practice, and at times, simple logic to assess the foreseeability of a specific use. Each of these mechanisms is capable of direct application in
construing copyright’s original grant of exclusivity during the infringement inquiry as well. Perhaps more importantly, though, they
map rather well onto the form and purpose indicators that are central
to the foreseeable copying test.
In addition, the bipolarity of copyright disputes is likely to ensure
that, in the infringement context, parties will advance opposing constructions of foreseeability in much the same way as they do in the
contractual setting. Thus, in the contractual setting, there are three
parties in the overall scheme of things: (1) the original grantor of
rights, the state; (2) the original grantee, who is also the contractual
grantor (the licensor); and (3) the contractual grantee, the licensee.
When a court is called upon to interpret the scope of an assignment, the dispute is between the author in his capacity as contractual
grantor and the licensee, as contractual grantee. Courts use foreseeability as an objective proxy for parties’ intentions, to determine
whether or not the disputed use was part of the assignment. What is
critical, however, is that both parties to the dispute have opposing interests in interpreting the grant. The grantor prefers a narrow construction (to limit the assignment), while the grantee naturally prefers
a broader one.
In an infringement action, by contrast, the author as original grantee would now prefer an expansive construction of the grant, while the
original grantor, the state, would not be a party to the proceeding. In
the state’s place would be the defendant, whose interests, interestingly
enough, track those of the contractual grantor in the bilateral setting.
The defendant’s interest would thus be to narrow the grant, and
thereby minimize or avoid liability for infringement. Thus, the absence of a grantor seeking a narrow construction of the grant is accounted for by the presence of the defendant. Given the bipolar setting within which the entitlement and its scope are determined, it
replicates the exact same process and interests that are at play in the
contractual one.
It is worth emphasizing that even though it may appear as if the
foreseeability inquiry is one of subjective intent — that is, whether one
or both parties actually expected the grant to cover a use — in reality,
the determination is always objective.166 Since parties’ intentions on
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
166 Indeed, much of contract law has concerned itself with the move from a model of subjective
intention to one of objective intention, which some view as in itself problematic and detracting
from contract law’s avowed emphasis on the ideas of consent and party autonomy. For more on
objective intention in construing contractual terms, see LARRY A. DIMATTEO, CONTRACT

1612

HARVARD LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 122:1569

the issue are not readily apparent from the terms of the contract,
courts impute foresight (or the lack thereof) to parties based on external circumstantial evidence. The test is thus entirely objective and has
little to do with parties’ actual intentions. Consequently, the mere fact
that, unlike in the contract setting, one of the parties (the state, the
original grantor) is not present and able to advance a construction of
its actual intent is completely irrelevant. The bipolar nature of the
dispute before the court ensures that opposing constructions of the
grant are advanced in both contexts, even when either grantor or
grantee is not a party to the proceedings before the court.
Foreseeability as a limiting basis, then, is perfectly well known in
the world of copyright. Expanding it beyond its current use in the bilateral context, to construing copyright’s original grant of exclusivity
as well, is likely to face few conceptual hurdles.
3. Mirroring Nonobviousness. — The foreseeable copying test requires a court to go back in time to the year in which the work was
created (and copyright attached to it) in order to determine whether
the defendant’s present use was capable of being anticipated then. In
many ways, its retrospective nature mirrors patent law’s requirement
of nonobviousness. The law requires courts to invalidate a patent if
the subject matter of the invention would have been obvious to a “person having ordinary skill in the art” (that is, the PHOSITA) “at the
time the invention was made.”167 To determine whether inventions
were nonobvious, courts are thus required to put themselves not just
in the shoes of potential inventors, but to base their finding on inventors’ likely awareness at the time of the invention.168 In constructing
the entitlement — that is, the patent — courts thus go back in time to
assess what should have been known to the inventor when the invention was made and thereupon validate the invention only if it was not
obvious then.
Foreseeable copying would have courts do just the opposite. The
test asks courts to determine whether the defendant’s present use
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
THEORY: THE EVOLUTION OF CONTRACTUAL INTENT (1998); LON L. FULLER & MELVIN
ARON EISENBERG, BASIC CONTRACT LAW 743–46 (7th ed. 2001); Larry A. DiMatteo, The
Counterpoise of Contracts: The Reasonable Person Standard and the Subjectivity of Judgment, 48
S.C. L. REV. 293 (1997); and Nancy Kim, Mistakes, Changed Circumstances and Intent, 56 U.
KAN. L. REV. 473 (2008).
167 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) (2006). For more on the PHOSITA standard, see Rebecca S. Eisenberg,
Obvious to Whom? Evaluating Inventions from the Perspective of PHOSITA, 19 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 885 (2004).
168 See In re Kotzab, 217 F.3d 1365, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (noting the importance of relying on
“then-accepted wisdom in the field” in making the determination); In re Dembiczak, 175 F.3d 994,
999 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (noting the importance of “casting the mind back to the time of invention”);
Kloster Speedsteel AB v. Crucible Inc., 793 F.2d 1565, 1574 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (emphasizing the importance of focusing the decisionmaker’s mind on what would have been obvious “when the invention was made”).

2009]

COPYRIGHT INCENTIVES

1613

should have been “obvious” to the creator (the plaintiff) at the time of
the creation, not to constrict the entitlement, but rather to expand it.
Courts, in working the test, might thus adopt an equivalent of the
PHOSITA standard that is calibrated to the world of creators. Such a
standard would presume creators are, at a minimum, informed — in
the sense that the creator knows of the different mediums in existence
in which the work can be employed — and rational — in that the
creator intends to either directly or indirectly control the markets for
those different mediums.
***
Based on this discussion, consider the following hypotheticals:
Example 1: K, a composer, creates a musical work in the year 1955.
At the time, television and broadcast technology are well known, as is
the process of using music for motion pictures. All the same, the
videocassette recorder (VCR) has not been developed yet. In 1985, a
few years after VCRs become commercially available, S makes a copy
of K’s work on a VHS tape when it airs on television. In addition, P,
a producer, uses the work in a television broadcast without a license.
These uses implicate K’s exclusive right to reproduce the work. Assume that in 1990, K were to commence an action for copyright infringement against P and S. Under the proposed requirement of foreseeability, the onus would be on K to establish that both P’s and S’s
uses of the work constitute forms of “foreseeable copying” — uses that
were foreseeable in 1955, that is, when K created the work. K would
have little problem doing this in relation to P’s actions, given that
television broadcasts were well known in 1955, but vis-à-vis S his case
would be more difficult, since VCRs were neither known nor invented
in 1955.169 A court is thus likely to conclude that since video recording is “markedly different” from mere television viewing, the use of
the work therein was not foreseeable and S’s use is not foreseeable
copying.170
Example 2: C, a software developer, creates a short software program to diagnose system errors. N comes along and, finding the code
employed to be aesthetically pleasing, begins using large parts of it on
a line of bed linen that he begins to market. N’s use is likely to implicate C’s exclusive rights to reproduce and (perhaps) adapt the work.
Here, foreseeable copying would place the burden on C to establish
that N’s use of his literary work as part of a new line of bed linen was
foreseeable (even if as a derivative work) at the time of creation.
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
169 The hypothetical here tracks the facts of a well-known licensing dispute, in which the question was whether the grant of television rights covered the right to distribute the content on videocassettes. The court, using a foreseeability standard, answered the question in the negative.
Cohen, 845 F.2d at 851.
170 See id. at 854.
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While the inquiry does not assume the question to be answered one
way or the other, a court is perhaps more likely than not to find
against C on the issue of foreseeability.171
Example 3: JK, an author, writes a bestselling work of fiction in
the year 1970, at which time motion picture and related technologies
are well known. In 1997, W produces a motion picture based entirely
on JK’s novel, and in 1998 G develops a computer video game based
on the novel. Both W’s and G’s actions implicate JK’s exclusive adaptation right. Here, however, the outcomes are likely to be different.
Since motion picture technology and the use of literary works as storylines therein might have been well-established practices (and the market for them objectively anticipatable) when JK created the work, a
court is likely to conclude that W’s use was indeed foreseeable. As for
G, however, the market for video gaming and the technology on which
it relies were neither in existence nor anticipated in 1970, and a court
is likely to conclude that G’s actions were unforeseeable in form and
purpose.
JK’s case serves to highlight an important point. Merely because a
defendant’s use is different from the creator’s does not mean that it automatically comes to be exempted from liability. Not all new uses are
unforeseeable. Where new uses are indeed foreseeable, as in the case
of traditional derivatives, the foreseeability test is likely to come out in
favor of the plaintiff, with few exceptions. The reason for this is simple: the possibility of a movie adaptation might have formed some part
of JK’s incentive in creating the work.
B. Compatibility: Foreseeability and Copyright’s
Incentive Structure
A test of foreseeability is likely to limit a creator’s control over the
uses to which his creation may be put. Specifically, it would eliminate
those uses that are objectively unforeseeable at the time of creation
from the scope of the entitlement. What effect, if any, is this likely to
have on creators’ ex ante incentives to create? Is knowing that they
are unlikely to be able to control unanticipated uses of their work
likely to affect their inducement to create the work to begin with? Alternatively, will it impact their incentive to distribute the work?
This section argues that a foreseeability-based limit is perfectly
compatible with copyright’s basic structure as an incentive. Specifi–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
171 A secondary, yet important, question relates to the defendant’s — that is, N’s — own creativity and the way in which the copyright system needs to evaluate that as part of the process.
Once foreseeable copying works to delineate a creator’s incentive-driven markets, the analysis of
whether the social utility from N’s creation is enough reason to generate an exception, in light of
the costs and benefits of giving a creator control over it, is best accomplished by the traditional
fair use analysis.
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cally, it looks to how foreseeability might interact with two prominent
ways in which incentives are often modeled in the copyright context.
The first is the tendency to equate the idea of incentives with creators’
optimistic expectations, even when devoid of any objective basis. The
second derives from the “prospect theory,” which is used to justify patent law’s grant of an early, tailored monopoly to an inventor once a
minimal threshold of inventiveness is crossed, in the belief that this is
likely to incentivize additional investment into the invention.
1. Open-ended Expectations. — Given the development of technological media over the last several decades and the incremental extension of copyright terms by Congress that has followed, one might argue that creators today rightfully expect such developments to occur,
and are indeed driven (that is, incentivized) by the expectation.172 If
they tend to factor these expectations into their ex ante creative decisionmaking, why should copyright now vindicate them ex post?
To begin with, it is worth noting that these open-ended expectations differ from the paradigmatic incentive. Unlike incentives that
are grounded in ascertainable market indicators, expectations rely almost entirely on predictions that derive from events in the past that
have no independent reason to repeat themselves in the future. Thus,
a creator’s expectation in creating a work today, hoping that at some
time in the future Congress is likely to retroactively extend the copyright term simply because it has done so before, is markedly different
from her incentive in creating the work: attempting to satisfy an identifiable demand for works of that nature and generating profits from
the process. Similarly, a creator’s belief that her work will come to be
used in association with some wholly unforeseeable medium, merely
because such unforeseeable media emerged in the past, represents an
expectation that is not necessarily grounded in anything other than a
bald prediction that a historical contingency is likely to repeat itself.173
It is not readily apparent that copyright needs to validate every ex ante
estimate or expectation of a creator.
Yet, one might still want such expectations to form some part of
copyright’s incentive structure, in the same way as a lottery with fluctuating odds does in the end provide individuals with an incentive of
some kind. Indeed, current policy tends to favor their inclusion. As
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
172 Indeed, the Supreme Court seems to have adopted precisely such an argument in its validation of the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act. See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 215
(2003). The Court there recognized the possibility of future term extensions forming a part of
copyright’s incentive structure. In addition, the Court referred to Congress’s “consistent historical
practice” of extending copyright’s term and applying the extension retroactively. Id. at 204.
173 To the extent that it is indeed grounded in an awareness of the industry in question and
technological developments therein, it is likely to be characterized as foreseeable under the standard and test described earlier. The discussion here, therefore, is restricted to predictions and expectations that are not grounded in such an awareness.
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Professor Sara Stadler notes, courts and legislators are often driven by
creators’ “expectations” (determined ex post) in constructing copyright’s actual incentive, creating a cycle that results in the outward expansion of copyright’s exclusive rights regime.174 The process of determining the incentive is then indirectly delegated to creators — who
equate their open-ended expectations with their incentives — resulting
in anything short of perfect control being viewed as less than optimal.175 A large part of this problem derives from the obvious use of
hindsight to reconstruct the ex ante incentive. Having brought the
work into existence, creators argue that they would not have done so
had they known that their open-ended expectations would not be realized, causing courts and policymakers to impute this ex post realization into their ex ante decisionmaking.
Leaving aside the question of whether this expectation should at all
be a part of copyright’s incentive structure if indeed we remain concerned with a satisfactory (as opposed to optimal or maximal) incentive, the question that persists is whether the test of foreseeable copying is likely to interfere directly with or diminish that expectation.
Here, the fact that the test is structured as an uncertain standard rather than as a bright-line rule is likely to make a major difference.176
Unlike rules, standards are characterized by their relegating the
process of giving content to the law and its application to a point in
time after an action has taken place, that is, ex post.177 Rules are generally more costly to create upfront (given the precision they involve),
while standards transfer those costs to the adjudicative process.178
Viewed ex ante, then, standards tend to be somewhat indeterminate (or
fuzzy), characterized by the uncertainty of their applicability to a specific context. This uncertainty, though, is responsible for minimizing
the law’s impact on creative decisionmaking.
Intellectual property laws — patent and copyright in specific —
contain innumerable vague standards.179 In many ways this is largely
beneficial. Standards enable courts to calibrate the scope of the enti–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
174 Stadler, supra note 30, at 454–56. For a slightly different argument on how expectations
influence risk aversion, thereby feeding back into the scope of the rights granted, see James Gibson, Risk Aversion and Rights Accretion in Intellectual Property Law, 116 YALE L.J. 882 (2007).
175 Stadler, supra note 30, at 440.
176 For an overview of the rule-standard distinction, see Ronald Dworkin, The Model of Rules,
35 U. CHI. L. REV. 14, 22–29 (1967); Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557 (1992); Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685, 1687–1701 (1976); Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Supreme Court, 1991
Term—Foreword: The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 HARV. L. REV. 22 (1992); and Cass R.
Sunstein, Problems with Rules, 83 CAL. L. REV. 953 (1995).
177 See Kaplow, supra note 176, at 560.
178 Id.
179 Gideon Parchomovsky & Kevin A. Goldman, Fair Use Harbors, 93 VA. L. REV. 1483, 1503
(2007).
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tlement to its underlying purpose and function.180 This is especially
true when it comes to standards that work to limit an entitlement. Incentives tend to vary from one inventor or creator to another or one
area of application to another, necessitating significant contextual finetuning.181 In these contexts, a bright-line rule would prove insufficient
for creators and inventors who need ex ante incentives in excess of the
curtailed entitlement, since the curtailment would be known upfront.
While a standard would not necessarily limit the entitlement any less
than an equivalent rule, it would only ever curtail the entitlement ex
post, thereby providing the creator or inventor with the necessary (but
probabilistic) incentive upfront. One might thus call this the perverse
effect of uncertainty on incentives. Because a creator or inventor does
not know ex ante that the entitlement is likely to exclude certain
things, the impact that the standard has on his incentive is minimal.
Indeed, this has long been recognized to be true in the patent law
context. Patent law, much like copyright law, is concerned with providing inventors with an incentive in the nature of an exclusionary
right. Since the process of innovation with which patent law is
concerned tends to entail greater investment of time and effort, the
incentive that it needs to provide to innovators has to be much
stronger — as manifested in the scope and coverage of its exclusionary
rights framework.182 Anything weaker than these broad incentives is
unlikely to result in the necessary investment of resources into the
process of innovation. Notwithstanding the need for these strong incentives, scholars have argued that standards-based ex post limits on
patent law’s grant of an exclusionary right are likely to have little impact on the original incentive. This analysis is particularly instructive
here.
Patent rights are inherently probabilistic by nature. Their existence, validity, and scope are contingent on a host of considerations,
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
180 This distinction between rules and standards translates most directly into the difference between the strategies of “exclusion” and “governance” that property law uses to allocate and enforce its grant of rights. See Henry E. Smith, Exclusion Versus Governance: Two Strategies for
Delineating Property Rights, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. S453 (2002). Exclusion strategies such as trespass, much like rules, entail high upfront delineation costs and low ex post enforcement costs,
while governance strategies such as nuisance do just the opposite. See Henry E. Smith, Exclusion
and Property Rules in the Law of Nuisance, 90 VA. L. REV. 965 (2004). Governance strategies
enable courts to carry out balancing exercises as circumstances demand and thereby contextualize
the entitlement to an exogenously defined purpose.
181 Michael Carroll identifies this as the problem of “uniformity cost” in intellectual property
law and notes that context-specific standards serve to minimize these costs. See Michael W. Carroll, One For All: The Problem of Uniformity Cost in Intellectual Property Law, 55 AM. U. L.
REV. 845, 856–61, 890–92 (2006).
182 This is seen most prominently in the absence of an independent invention defense and a fair
use limitation in patent law. For more on this, see Maureen A. O’Rourke, Toward a Doctrine of
Fair Use in Patent Law, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1177, 1184–87 (2000).
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most of which are outside the owner’s (that is, creator’s) control.183
Uncertainty thus manifests itself in more ways than one until the right
is adjudicated. Consequently, contingent ex post limits have little impact on the original incentive, given the extent of uncertainty that already exists. In a counterintuitive move, Professors Ian Ayres and
Paul Klemperer argue that increasing patent law’s overall uncertainty
through underinclusive standards, as opposed to overinclusive rules, in
order to reduce the system’s predictability, is likely to curb monopolistic pricing without impacting a patentee’s original incentive.184 They
thus advocate the use of standards-based doctrines such as the “reverse
doctrine of equivalence,” which allows a defendant to avoid liability ex
post by showing that his actions were not within the “principle” of the
claimed invention, even though they fall within its scope when literally
construed.185 Such doctrines, they argue, have little effect on a patentee’s original incentive to invest resources into the innovation process, even though the possibility of their being used later on (to diminish
the entitlement) is known upfront.186 Since their invocation and use
depend on events, the occurrence of which are inherently unpredictable — that is, unforeseeable — they have little impact on a patentee’s
ex ante incentives.
To be sure, Ayres and Klemperer recognize that this increase in the
uncertainty of enforcement needs to be compensated in order to avoid
interfering significantly with an innovator’s incentive.187 Consequently, they advocate extending a patent’s duration — again ex post — to
offset any increased uncertainty, using a system of Ramsey pricing.188
They propose implementing this part of their model by allowing patentees to leverage their power into the future, or alternatively expanding the geographic or product scope of the patent.189 In the copyright
context, the Ramsey intuition side of their model could be imple–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
183 On the probabilistic nature of property and intellectual property rights, see Mark A. Lemley
& Carl Shapiro, Probabilistic Patents, 19 J. ECON. PERSP. 75 (2005); and Keith Leffler & Cristofer Leffler, The Probabilistic Nature of Patent Rights: In Response to Kevin McDonald, ANTITRUST, Summer 2003, at 77.
184 See Ian Ayres & Paul Klemperer, Limiting Patentees’ Market Power Without Reducing Innovation Incentives: The Perverse Benefits of Uncertainty and Non-Injunctive Remedies, 97
MICH. L. REV. 985 (1999).
185 Id. at 1025.
186 Id. at 1025–26.
187 Id. at 1001.
188 Id. at 1026–27. Ramsey pricing involves pricing goods inversely to the elasticity of demand
for the firm’s products but without a profit constraint. See LANDES & POSNER, supra note 20, at
40 n.6. Translated to the intellectual property context, this concept implies that if a monopolist’s
profits are held constant, “consumers would be better off living under oligopolistic pricing for a
longer period than monopoly pricing for a shorter period.” Ayres & Klemperer, supra note 184, at
991. The deadweight losses, then, get spread over a long duration, but their severity at any given
point in time is reduced.
189 Ayres & Klemperer, supra note 184, at 1026–28.
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mented in more ways than one. First, if enhancing copyright’s term of
protection is indeed a possible offset, one might argue that this effect is
in some ways already in place, given the periodicity with which Congress extends terms retroactively without a valid empirical basis for
the extension. Using the Ayres-Klemperer framework, current copyright policy already reflects elements of staggered-duration Ramsey
pricing, making the introduction of additional uncertainty,
via a foreseeability test, the equivalent of their “stationarity intuition.”190 In the alternative, another option would certainly lie in
minimizing reliance on the currently incomprehensible fair use doctrine — something the foreseeability test is likely to achieve on its own
by moving most of these fair use–related issues to the entitlement delineation process.
In more simple terms, Professor Robert Merges argues that the reverse doctrine of equivalents, as an ex post limit, is likely to have no
more than a minimal effect on the original incentive, given the numerous other contingencies that the patentee is faced with even before that
stage is reached.191 The inherently probabilistic nature of the rights
bundle thus generates sufficient uncertainty on its own, such that the
uncertainty that the vague standard adds to it is marginal.
Others such as Professors Michael Meurer and Craig Nard go one
step further. They argue that limiting patent law’s doctrine of equivalents — which allows a patentee to control uses of the invention that
were not foreseeable and therefore not literally covered by the patent’s
claims — is likely to have little to no impact on the original incentive.192 They argue that as long as the entitlement allows the inventor
to cover her “appreciation of industry and technology trends,” curtailing the entitlement ex post, by eliminating unforeseeable developments
from its coverage, is unlikely to have an appreciable impact on incentives.193 They thus observe that the “incentive is not harmed much
when, ex post, [an inventor] is denied [protection] over technology that
she did not foresee ex ante.”194
Since carving unforeseeable uses out of the entitlement ex post is
not thought to be problematic in the context of patents, where the in–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
190 See id. at 989–90. This is the intuition that small deviations from a monopolist’s profitmaximizing price or quantity will have less of an effect on a monopolist’s overall benefits, but will
have a larger effect on minimizing deadweight losses, thereby producing a net welfare gain.
191 Robert Merges, Intellectual Property Rights and Bargaining Breakdown: The Case of Blocking Patents, 62 TENN. L. REV. 75, 101–03 (1994).
192 See Michael J. Meurer & Craig Allen Nard, Invention, Refinement and Patent Claim Scope:
A New Perspective on the Doctrine of Equivalents, 93 GEO. L.J. 1947, 1996–97 (2005); see also
Julie E. Cohen & Mark A. Lemley, Patent Scope and Innovation in the Software Industry, 89
CAL. L. REV. 1, 50 (2001).
193 Meurer & Nard, supra note 192, at 1997.
194 Id. at 1998.
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centive is much closer to the ideal of perfect control, it is indeed more
than plausible that a similar limit is likely to be even less problematic
in the copyright context. First, copyright’s entitlement structure is certainly more contingent or probabilistic than is its equivalent in patent
law. The absence of an administrative agency validating the grant at
first instance, coupled with copyright’s emphasis on a showing of actual and actionable copying, make its grant more uncertain. Second,
our focus here is on the impact that a foreseeability limit is likely to
have on unpredictable expectations. To the extent that these expectations are not based on industry and technology trends but rather on
stochastic occurrences whose probabilities are not ascertainable, they
only ever enter the equation with a very high initial level of uncertainty. Consequently, any additional uncertainty that the test as an ex
post standard will introduce so as to diminish the overall incentive is
likely to be insignificant.
Additionally, ex post, indeterminate constraints on exclusivity are
rather well known in copyright law, in the form of the fair use
doctrine.195 Structured as a standard, it too renders copyright’s grant
of exclusivity contingent on factors that are often outside a creator’s
control and in many ways unpredictable.196 In circumstances where
a court concludes that the defendant’s use is sufficiently transformative, or substantially noninfringing, fair use effectively circumscribes
the grant ex post. Few argue that fair use needs to be eliminated
because its contextual ex post uncertainty interferes with creator incentives.197 The uncertainty of the standard, if anything, is likely to deter
potential users (that is, potential infringers) from treading too close to
the boundaries of impermissible copying.198 Indirectly, therefore, the
uncertainty associated with the foreseeable copying test is likely
to preserve creators’ original incentives by deterring significant
infringement.
What is more likely to interfere with creators’ original incentives is
a bright-line rule that limits copyright’s grant ex ante. Proposals
aimed at contextually limiting a copyright holder’s bundle of rights ex
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
195
196

See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006).
See Douglas Lichtman, Property Rights in Emerging Platform Technologies, 29 J. LEGAL
STUD. 615, 637–38 (2000) (observing that fair use excuses infringement whenever “public policy
favors that result,” id. at 637, and that it is an “all-inclusive, equitable inquiry,” id. at 638).
197 To the contrary, the dominant view appears to be that the fair use doctrine stifles innovation
by not allowing defendants sufficient leeway to use protected works. See, e.g., Kevin M. Lemley,
The Innovative Medium Defense: A Doctrine To Promote the Multiple Goals of Copyright in the
Wake of Advancing Digital Technologies, 110 PENN. ST. L. REV. 111, 128–29 (2005); Adrienne J.
Marsh, Fair Use and New Technology: The Appropriate Standards To Apply, 5 CARDOZO L. REV.
635, 643–44 (1984).
198 See Parchomovsky & Goldman, supra note 179, at 1498 (noting that “the vagueness of the
fair use standard” causes actors to “err on the side of safety and either overcomply (by minimizing
the use of protected works) or overinvest in precautions”).
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ante suffer from this drawback. Consequently, an ex post standard is
preferable to a bright-line rule that would limit the grant ex ante and
thereby interfere with a creator’s incentives, as others have noted in
the patent context.199
If copyright’s incentive structure thus entails avoiding any harm to
creators’ expectations, regardless of their bases, structuring the foreseeability test as a fuzzy standard will ensure that any impact it is
likely to have on these expectations is, at best, marginal.
2. Prospect Theory. — A second argument derives from a variant
of incentive theory that finds application in the world of patents and is
commonly referred to as the “prospect theory.”200 According to this
theory, the exclusive rights regime operates much like a mineral prospecting system with the creator being given an incentive to invest further in the creation and improve upon it, without fear that free-riders
will appropriate the benefits of it.201 While the theory originated in
the context of patents, it is often employed as a justificatory device in
copyright law.202
The prospect argument assumes that giving creators greater control
ex ante incentivizes their own actual development of efficient uses ex
post.203 It thus ties in with what some describe as copyright’s distributional incentive — the idea that copyright exists to give creators an incentive to both create and distribute their work publicly. Control over
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
199 See Ayres & Klemperer, supra note 184, at 1024 (noting how underinclusive standards are
preferable to rules and overinclusive standards). Quite apart from interfering with creator incentives, replacing the current standards-based approach with a rule-based one would also likely alter a copyright owner’s willingness to bargain with a potential user, as a consequence of the
uncertainty being eliminated altogether. See Dan L. Burk, Muddy Rules for Cyberspace,
21 CARDOZO L. REV. 121, 140 (1999); cf. Jason Scott Johnston, Bargaining Under Rules Versus
Standards, 11 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 256, 258 (1995). But cf. Parchomovsky & Goldman, supra
note 179, at 1502 (advocating the introduction of specific contextual fair use rules into copyright
doctrine).
200 The prospect theory is attributed to the work of Professor Edmund Kitch. See Edmund W.
Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. & ECON. 265 (1977); see also John
F. Duffy, Rethinking the Prospect Theory of Patents, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 439 (2004). This theory
bears no connection to the prospect theory in behavioral economics. See Daniel Kahneman &
Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under Risk, 47 ECONOMETRICA 263
(1979).
201 Kitch, supra note 200, at 266.
202 See Mark A. Lemley, The Economics of Improvement in Intellectual Property Law, 75 TEX.
L. REV. 989, 1047 (1997) (“While Kitch makes his argument in the patent context, it is copyright
rather than patent law that seems to have taken his theory to heart.”). Professor Michael
Abramowicz argues that the dominant theme in the prospect theory is the idea of avoiding wasteful rent dissipation, and attempts to use it to explain copyright law’s protection for derivative
works. See Michael Abramowicz, A Theory of Copyright’s Derivative Right and Related Doctrines, 90 MINN. L. REV. 317, 351, 355–56 (2005).
203 See Mark A. Lemley, Ex Ante Versus Ex Post Justifications for Intellectual Property, 71 U.
CHI. L. REV. 129, 132–35 (2004) (describing the use of this theory to justify copyright’s retrospective term extension under the CTEA).
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unforeseeable uses, it might be argued, gives them an incentive to develop aftermarkets that were not obvious to them at the time of creation. One might thus characterize the argument as one relating to an
ex post incentive.204
First, it is not readily apparent why a creator is best placed to control and direct future development of the creation.205 Historically, the
most beneficial new uses for works and ideas have almost never come
from creators and inventors of the originals.206 Most new uses entail
the development of new technologies of distribution and thus involve
inventive processes unconnected with those of a creator, which are
more likely to be artistic or literary. Consequently, barring entities that
engage in both creativity and research into new mechanisms of distribution — unquestionably a small minority — the two are unlikely to
go together. The process of creation in copyright law is additionally
far less resource intensive than is the process of developing new
mechanisms (that is, technologies) of distribution. As a result, there
seems little reason to believe that the creator of an expressive work is
best placed to invest in the management or development of new uses
for that work, when that investment is likely to be orthogonal to, and
far in excess of, the one made for the original creation. Thus, for instance, it is not clear why the Beatles (or any music group) might have
been expected to invest in the development of digital recording just
because they created the expressive work that is the subject of the recording. Unlike in patent law, there remains little basis to believe that
the original creator is best positioned to develop new uses, a fact that
is borne out vividly in copyright cases involving new uses.207
In response, it might be argued that even if creators themselves are
not best placed to invest in further development, they might license
this out to others; copyright’s grant of exclusivity then becomes necessary to incentivize these others to invest in the development process.
In this formulation, exclusivity in the post-creation market functions as
a distributional incentive, not for creators, but rather for independent
distributors such as record companies.
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
204
205

Id. at 132.
Id. at 135–36. As Professor Mark Lemley rightly notes, this logic flies in the face of the
fundamental idea that competition — and deconcentration in markets — is preferable for simple
efficiency reasons. Indeed, this principle dominates antitrust law’s prohibition on tying and other
forms of exclusive dealing arrangements. For a few academic articles discussing tying, see Ward
S. Bowman, Jr., Tying Arrangements and the Leverage Problem, 67 YALE L.J. 19 (1957); Jay Pil
Choi, Tying and Innovation: A Dynamic Analysis of Tying Arrangements, 114 ECON. J. 83 (2004);
and Keith N. Hylton & Michael Salinger, Tying Law and Policy: A Decision-Theoretic Approach,
69 ANTITRUST L.J. 469 (2001).
206 See Lemley, supra note 203, at 137 & n.29. He notes: “Creators are often terrible managers.
They frequently misunderstand the significance of their own invention and the uses to which it
can be put.” Id. at 137.
207 See cases cited supra note 3.
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Even if distributors do need an incentive to invest in developing
the market for new distribution mechanisms, it seems to make little
sense to vest it in the creator on the assumption that the rights will
come to be allocated most efficiently. In a world of zero transaction
costs, this would indeed make no difference, but where these costs are
significant and remain coupled with the problem of potential holdouts
(for example, a creator refusing to license the work to a distributor for
whimsical reasons), the argument seems fairly problematic. If distributional incentives are indeed necessary, a more plausible basis for
them might lie in creating an independent entitlement and vesting it in
the distributor directly.208
One of the main concerns motivating the prospect theory in the patent context is the idea that if an inventor is not allowed to control future uses and development of the invention early on, this is likely to
result in wasteful duplicative efforts among inventors. An improver
might decide to take the inventor’s nascent idea and develop and
commercialize it, regardless of the fact that the inventor is doing the
exact same thing (perhaps in the belief that he is likely to be the first
to do so). This, the prospect theory argues, results in a redundancy, or
deadweight loss, that has no social benefit.209 Multiple inventors
might expend resources, not just to get the initial patent monopoly, but
also later on, to improve and commercially develop the invention.
Since such efforts are likely to be wasteful, the prospect theory argues
for a forward-looking patent regime that extends a patentee’s grant
beyond the immediate idea to unforeseeable uses of it as well.210
This concern with redundancy sits somewhat oddly within the
broader scheme of copyright policy, which otherwise actively encourages such redundancies. Copyright’s defense of independent creation
has long been identified as one of its defining features, and one that
sets it apart from patent.211 Perhaps more importantly, copyright law
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
208 Indeed, a new set of rights referred to as “neighboring rights” or “related rights” attempts to
do precisely this by giving distributors exclusionary control over their investments. See Shyamkrishna Balganesh, The Social Costs of Property Rights in Broadcast (and Cable) Signals, 22
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1303, 1305–06 (2008). The most well-known neighboring rights are performers’ rights, phonogram producers’ rights, and broadcasters’ rights. See id. passim; George
H.C. Bodenhausen, Protection of “Neighboring Rights,” LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter
1954, at 156.
209 See Abramowicz, supra note 202, at 352 (“In the absence of patent protection . . . [m]ore inventors may pursue a particular line of research than is socially optimal.”).
210 See Mark F. Grady & Jay I. Alexander, Patent Law and Rent Dissipation, 78 VA. L. REV.
305, 318–20 (1992).
211 For an overview of the doctrine and an economic explanation for it in terms of information
cost theory, see Clarisa Long, Information Costs in Patent and Copyright, 90 VA. L. REV. 465,
528–29 (2004); and Henry E. Smith, Intellectual Property As Property: Delineating Entitlements
in Information, 116 YALE L.J. 1742, 1810–11 (2007). For an attempt to extend the idea to patent
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has long avoided according protection to ideas, with the result that
expressive variations that rely on a single idea are tolerated, even
when actively copied.212 If the law recognizes and tolerates multiple
versions in these different contexts, it seems unlikely to find the development of a use that the creator could not identify as being problematic or redundant in the sense that patent law might. In addition, the
law actively tolerates (and encourages) duplicative expressions of the
same idea. Indeed, when the possibility of such redundancy is not
deemed sufficient to interfere with copyright’s original incentive (that
is, to create), its interference with ex post incentives through a loosening of control over unforeseeable uses is likely to be negligible, if not
nonexistent.
In many ways, then, the prospect theory operates on assumptions
that seem alien to copyright’s general structure, and perhaps more importantly, to the peculiarities of unforeseeable uses in the context of
expressive works.
***
A requirement of foreseeability — whereby a creator is denied control over unforeseeable uses of the work — is unlikely to interfere significantly with his original incentive to create the work. The impact it
is likely to have, if any, is marginal. To the contrary, one might argue,
the rule is likely to generate a new kind of incentive among creators.
The foreseeability test is in the end an objective one, dependent on
the general state of knowledge at the time of creation, which is then
imputed to the creator. Consequently, in situations where the creator
is best positioned to generate this level of knowledge, the test incentivizes the creator to actually make it widely known. Take the case of a
company that invests in the development of both software and hardware technologies. Assume that the company were to develop a new
software program that meets the requirements for copyright protection, and that it foresees the possibility of the program finding application in a new platform (in addition to those in existence) that it is in
the process of developing. Instead of being able to keep the new platform (or the technology that it is likely to employ there) completely secret, the requirement would force it to generate an objective level of
knowledge about the platform. This could include simple trade journal publications or other research disclosures where it describes the
basis of the new platform’s use of the copyrighted work (that is, the

–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
law, see Samson Vermont, Independent Invention As a Defense to Patent Infringement, 105
MICH. L. REV. 475 (2006).
212 See Abramowicz, supra note 202, at 355 (referring to the idea-expression dichotomy in
copyright).
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software).213 Disclosures of this kind are likely to be of immense benefit socially, and the principle of foreseeability would create an active
incentive for it. By making the scope of liability depend on the plaintiff’s disclosure of possible uses in situations where the plaintiff is indeed in the best position to foresee new uses, the requirement would
create an ex ante incentive to disseminate information relating to possible uses widely.
Foreseeability as an information-generating incentive performs a
function that is the mirror image of its role in tort law. In the absence
of a foreseeability limit, tort law would have individuals devoting
needless time and energy to assessing the probabilities of remote events
in order to avoid liability.214 In the copyright context, by contrast,
there is a potential benefit (as opposed to liability) and perhaps more
importantly, a basic recognition that the additional information generated (or likely to be generated) is socially beneficial rather than wasteful. In this latter respect, foreseeable copying resembles the rule in
Hadley.215 A creator’s acquisition of knowledge that his work could
be used in relation to a new platform technology that is in the process
of being developed is clearly different from a potential tortfeasor
spending resources to know that his actions could trigger an infinite
variety of harms or injuries among individuals in the vicinity of his actions. A foreseeability rule in the context of copyright creates an incentive to generate the former, just as a foreseeability rule in the context of torts operates to deter the latter.
V. OBJECTIONS
Having examined how a test of foreseeability might work in the
copyright context, its likely impact on creator incentives, and the manner in which courts might implement it, this Part examines four potential objections that may be raised to such a test. They are that: (1) a
foreseeability limit renders copyright’s term of protection meaningless,
(2) as a standard it is indeterminate, (3) it will result in the scope of
protection varying with the point in time that a work was created, and
finally (4) it is likely to rely heavily on hindsight.
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
213 Of course, the system would not want inventors to disclose information such that other systems of intellectual property (that is, patents and trade secrets) might later deny them protection.
An alternative might thus be a mechanism for creators to make these disclosures to an administrative agency under conditions of secrecy; here, however, the social benefits of the disclosure are
unlikely to be realized.
214 See Zipursky, supra note 108, at 47 (noting how the acquisition of such information is “socially inefficient”).
215 See Lucian Ayre Bebchuk & Steven Shavell, Information and the Scope of Liability for
Breach of Contract: The Rule of Hadley v. Baxendale, 7 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 284, 286 (1991) (observing that when one party’s communication of information to the other is “socially desirable,”
the foreseeability requirement in Hadley provides an incentive for it).
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A. Term Redundancy
Since 1950, Congress has extended copyright’s term of protection
twelve times, and today works are protected for the life of the author
plus seventy years.216 On its face, one might argue, a test of foreseeability will by necessity come to limit this duration. No creator can
expect to foresee uses to which the work may be put nine decades into
the future; consequently, copyright’s long term of protection becomes
somewhat redundant. The existence of an extended period of protection might be taken as evidence of an intent to protect unforeseeable
uses as well.
It is precisely the existence of this abnormally long period of protection that justifies nontemporal limits on copyright. In the world of intellectual property, the existence of tradeoffs between term and extent
remains somewhat well known. Thus, while patent law gives inventors a set of exclusive rights for no more than twenty years (unlike
copyright’s seventy), the extent and coverage of those rights are far
wider than those of copyright.217 Unlike copyright, patent rights are
not limited by numerous subject-matter limits and purpose-based exceptions, which is taken to justify the correspondingly short term of
protection.218 Copyright’s extended term is therefore a policy reason
to relax rather than strengthen its coverage nontemporally.
The frequency with which Congress has extended copyright’s term,
yet left intact its basic entitlement structure — without seeking to take
it in the direction of patent law — is perhaps additionally indicative of
its acceptance of (or acquiescence in) judicially created, non-term related, limiting devices.
In addition, tailoring the scope of the entitlement bundle on a caseby-case basis (instead of tinkering around with duration) does, from a
policy perspective, address an added concern: uniformity costs, or the
fact that different types of creativity and different creators have vastly
different incentive structures, which a one-size-fits-all approach to entitlement delineation glosses over.219 Thus, a life-plus-forty year term
of protection may be well in excess of what a movie producer needs as
an incentive to produce the work, but may on the other hand be in–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
216 17 U.S.C. § 302 (2006). For anonymous works, the term of protection is 95 years from the
year of first publication, or 120 years from the year of its first creation, whichever expires earlier.
Id. § 302(c). The most recent extension, the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act (CTEA),
was the subject matter of a well-known Supreme Court decision. See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537
U.S. 186 (2003).
217 See Smith, supra note 211, at 1806–14 (discussing these differences); see also William M.
Landes & Richard Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law, in ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
OF THE LAW 83, 94–96 (Donald A. Wittman ed., 2003).
218 See Smith, supra note 211, at 1812.
219 See Carroll, supra note 181, at 852–56; see also Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Patent Law, the Federal Circuit, and the Supreme Court: A Quiet Revolution, 11 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 1, 5 (2004).
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adequate for a musician.220 Here, a foreseeability limit allows the entitlement to track the incentive on a significantly more granular basis.
Indeed, one might argue that it compensates for the intrinsic redundancy of a uniform term limit.
B. Potential Indeterminacy
A second and perhaps more basic objection to the proposed model derives from the flexibility inherent in the idea of foreseeability.
This objection might proceed as follows. Ascertaining whether a defendant’s copying is foreseeable or not is dependent on the specificity
with which the form or mechanism of copying is described. Consequently, the same action might be classified as foreseeable or unforeseeable depending on a judge’s description of it — rendering its application grossly inconsistent.
An argument along these lines is somewhat well known in relation
to foreseeability’s use in tort law.221 Referred to as the “multiple description” problem, it postulates that speaking of foreseeability is meaningless in the absence of individuals having a system of shared meaning that they adhere to in their description of an event.222 Given the
fact that the foreseeability of an event (or use) is only ever reconstructed ex post, when additional details are known, judges and juries
are likely to come to different conclusions on the same set of facts, depending entirely on their descriptions of the event.
To the extent that foreseeability depends on an individual’s description of an event, it certainly is subject to some amount of indeterminacy.223 Yet the fact of the matter remains that at some basic level,
individuals do share a common set of conceptual meanings in understanding the way the world works. Most of tort law, and indeed the
common law, takes this for granted, and it would seem somewhat inconsistent to argue that foreseeability will fall prey to a level of indeterminacy any greater than that fostered by current common law devices. In the context of tort law, Professors H.L.A. Hart and Tony
Honoré thus argue:
[T]o avoid fallacies, the first question to ask is not “Was this harm foreseeable?” but “Under what specific description which fits this harm has

–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
220 See Carroll, supra note 181, at 856–57 (distinguishing between Type I and Type II errors
associated with uniformity).
221 See Perry, supra note 137, at 99–101; see also Richard A. Epstein, Beyond Foreseeability:
Consequential Damages in the Law of Contract, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 105, 124 (1989) (noting how
foreseeability “utterly lacks the descriptive content that allows it to be the principled basis for
decision”).
222 See Michael S. Moore, Foreseeing Harm Opaquely, in ACTION AND VALUE IN CRIMINAL
LAW 125, 126 (Stephen Shute et al. eds., 1993); see also Clarence Morris, Duty, Negligence and
Causation, 101 U. PA. L. REV. 189, 198 (1952).
223 See CLARENCE MORRIS, MORRIS ON TORTS 174–77 (1953).
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experience taught us to anticipate harm?” If we have learned from experience to expect a “rainstorm” on seeing dark clouds, then the rainstorm was
foreseeable even if, when it occurs, it has other characteristics . . . .224

Foreseeability thus places reliance on the existence of a common
meaning system among similarly situated individuals that derives from
shared experience. Descriptive variations thus do not correspond to
the reality that individuals tend to view the world (and respond to
stimuli in it) in similar ways. In studying human perception, noted
linguistic philosopher J.L. Austin observes that individuals tend to
“perceive” the world and understand themselves to be doing so in
roughly similar ways — in terms of what he called “moderate-sized
specimens of dry goods” or “familiar objects.”225 The existence of a
basic meaning structure is thus central to much of the law’s conceptual
framework and, to the extent that it might be characterized as indeterminate, so too is foreseeability.
The idea of a shared system of meaning is in many ways central to
current copyright doctrine. In the context of substantial similarity, for
instance, courts have long recognized that dissimilarities, while relevant to the inquiry, are to be differentiated into trivial and nontrivial
ones, the former being understood as those that involve modifications
to noncentral parts of the work.226 Whether something is a trivial
modification or not is inevitably a qualitative assessment, based on
what a court perceives to be central to the protected work. The test of
foreseeable copying would ask courts to do no more than extend that
logic beyond just the work, to its broader context or medium of use.
C. Time-Specific Protection
Should a work created in 1930 be protected any differently from
one created in 1995? The test of foreseeable copying attempts to model a creator’s entitlement by reference to objectively anticipated markets at the time a work was created. And as a consequence, the entitlement will certainly vary depending on the point in time that a work
was created. A technology (and therefore the market for works that it
gives rise to) may not have been capable of anticipation in 1930, but
certainly may have been so in 1995. Does this pose problems?
In situations where either the entitlement or liability derives from
an individual’s awareness or knowledge, the law rather commonly dif–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
224
225

H.L.A. HART & TONY HONORÉ, CAUSATION IN THE LAW 258 (2d ed. 1985).
J.L. AUSTIN, SENSE AND SENSIBILIA 7–8 (G.J. Warnock ed., 1962) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
226 See 4 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 42, § 13.03[B], at 13-67 to -73; OSTERBERG & OSTERBERG, supra note 46, § 2:6, at 2-32 to -34; see also Segrets, Inc. v. Gillman Knitwear Co., 207
F.3d 56, 65 (1st Cir. 2000) (finding an alteration in color to be a trivial and insubstantial
modification).
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ferentiates based on time in structuring the entitlement. Consequently,
describing the problem as one of differential protection begins with the
major assumption that uniform protection is indeed universally desirable, which clearly is not the case when the law is directed at generating an ex ante incentive. Thus, for instance, in the context of products
liability, a manufacturer is expected to warn consumers about risks
and hazards inherent in a product’s use and design, to avoid liability
for negligence.227 All the same, these risks and hazards are assessed
based on what the manufacturer either knew or should have known at
the time of manufacture. Information that becomes available subsequently (that is, as technology develops) is in this conception thought
to have no bearing on the question of liability, since a manufacturer
could not have been expected to warn consumers about risks that were
objectively incapable of being anticipated when the product was
manufactured.228 Indeed, studies have shown that allowing this ex
post information to influence the liability determination often skews
the ex ante incentive to take due care in making the disclosure —
which the regime is directed at generating.229 To the extent that the
regime values the creation of this incentive, fixing a temporal cutoff
for information becomes necessary. Since liability here relates to an ex
ante action (the failure to warn at the time of manufacture or sale), it
is modeled solely on the basis of the “state of the art” at the time of
that action. It thus is not considered unfair, from the incentivegenerating perspective, that a manufacturer of a product in 1970 is not
found liable for a failure to issue a warning based on information that
became available in 1980, but a manufacturer of the same product in
1990 certainly is. The same is equally true in the context of professional negligence, where standards often evolve over time, yet liability
(based on reasonable foreseeability) is based on information available
at the time of action.
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
227 See KEETON ET AL., supra note 103, § 96, at 685. This position is often referred to as the
“state-of-the-art defense” to products liability. It should be noted that courts and scholars have
disagreed on whether this approach ought to be abandoned in favor of one dependent entirely on
hindsight, given tort law’s concern with fairness and compensation. For an analysis of this trend,
see James A. Henderson, Jr., Coping with the Time Dimension in Products Liability, 69 CAL. L.
REV. 919 (1981). See also W. Page Keeton, Products Liability — Inadequacy of Information, 48
TEX. L. REV. 398 (1970) (advocating a move away from negligence to strict liability for fairness
reasons).
228 KEETON ET AL., supra note 103, § 96, at 685 (“[I]t is the state of the art in the sense of the
scientific knowledge and technological information regarding danger that was available to a seller
at the time such seller surrendered possession that is relevant and admissible as regards what he
should have known.”).
229 See Omri Ben-Shahar, Should Products Liability Be Based on Hindsight?, 14 J.L. ECON. &
ORG. 325 (1998) (observing how the use of ex post information often distorts the ex ante incentive
to take care, but that it often results in a new ex post incentive after the sale and distribution of
the product).
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Indeed, this idea is fairly well entrenched in patent law too, where
a PHOSITA’s knowledge and awareness (that is, the “state of the art”
in order to ascertain nonobviousness) are related back to the time the
invention was made, thereby disallowing the entry of after-the-event
information into the entitlement structuring process.230
If copyright law is in the end about the ex ante incentive to create,
and the entitlement is presumed to come into existence the moment the
work is created, it will of necessity vary with time, as the scope and
extent of those incentives fluctuate. To posit otherwise would, in a
sense, convert copyright into a doctrine of simple misappropriation,
where the point at which the entitlement comes into existence becomes
irrelevant and the focus of the law shifts entirely to what the defendant copied from the plaintiff.231 In this formulation, as should be apparent, the idea of ex ante incentives as the basis for the entitlement
becomes meaningless, since the entitlement only ever comes into existence at the time of the misappropriation. Consequently, to the extent
that the institution attempts to take seriously its reliance on ex ante incentives as a justificatory premise, temporally differentiated entitlements are not just unavoidable, but necessary.
D. Hindsight Bias
A fourth possible objection derives from a more nuanced understanding of individual decisionmaking and the cognitive biases that
occur therein. Hindsight bias refers to the general tendency among individuals to see an event that has occurred as more probable than it
actually was before its occurrence.232 The presence of information
about an outcome thus produces an unjustified increase in its perceived predictability.233 Given copyright law’s ex post process of enti–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
230 For opinions emphasizing the importance of relating the inquiry back in time to the point of
invention, see In re Kotzab, 217 F.3d 1365, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2000); and In re Dembiczak, 175 F.3d
994, 999 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
231 See Richard A. Posner, Misappropriation: A Dirge, 40 HOUS. L. REV. 621, 622–26 (2003)
(rejecting misappropriation as a unifying principle).
232 For a general overview of the hindsight bias and its influence on judicial decisionmaking,
see Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, A Positive Psychological Theory of Judging in Hindsight, 65 U. CHI. L.
REV. 571 (1998). See also Jay J.J. Christensen-Szalanski & Cynthia Fobian Willham, The Hindsight Bias: A Meta-Analysis, 48 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES
147 (1991).
233 Baruch Fischhoff, Hindsight ≠ Foresight: The Effect of Outcome Knowledge on Judgment
Under Uncertainty, 1 J. EXP. PSYCH. 288, 288 (1975). Professor Baruch Fischhoff’s work is credited with identifying the bias. See also Baruch Fischhoff, For Those Condemned To Study the
Past: Heuristics and Biases in Hindsight, in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS
AND BIASES 335 (Daniel Kahneman et al. eds., 1982). For studies verifying the existence of hindsight bias, see Erin M. Harley, Hindsight Bias in Legal Decision Making, 25 SOC. COGNITION
48 (2007); Kim A. Kamin & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Ex Post ≠ Ex Ante: Determining Liability in
Hindsight, 19 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 89 (1995); Mark Kelman et al., Decomposing Hindsight Bias,
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tlement delineation, any attempt to reconstruct a creator’s foresight at
the time of creation will inevitably be influenced by information possessed by the decisionmaker that was not available to the creator ex
ante. Judges will therefore be more inclined to view a defendant’s
copying as foreseeable to the plaintiff at the time of creation when presented with actual evidence of the copying.
In the related context of patent law, while determining the validity
of a patent, courts are required to determine whether the patentee’s
idea was nonobvious (to a skilled person) at the time of its invention.234 It thus entails a similar retrospective reconstruction of an
actor’s likely foresight. In that context, studies have shown that hindsight tends to play a major role.235 Given the structural similarity between the nonobviousness inquiry and the proposed foreseeability test
in copyright law, the same consequence is likely to occur in the latter.
As a structural matter, copyright lends itself almost perfectly to the
possibility of hindsight bias. Since the existence and scope of the entitlement in a work are only ever decided when the defendant copies
parts of it, the presence of actual copying (appropriation) tends to hurt
the defendant’s case. Indeed, as a historical matter, courts seem to
have acknowledged their reliance on hindsight with observations like
“what is worth copying is prima facie worth protecting.”236 A similar
situation, one might argue, is likely to occur in relation to the test of
foreseeable copying. Courts would be asked to determine whether a
particular form of copying was foreseeable in the past, yet they are
likely to make the determination with the market for the form of copying actually before them. To the extent that copyright law remains
structurally different from both patent and trademark law in its ex
post entitlement delineation, the test of foreseeability is likely to play
into the deficiencies of the existent system.
As scholars have long noted in several different contexts, hindsight
bias is indeed an inevitable consequence of any ex post liability and
entitlement delineation process.237 Studies have also shown that debiasing techniques — which often involve information-filtering devices
— are largely ineffective in controlling hindsight bias.238 As a conse–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
16 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 251 (1998); and Susan J. LaBine & Gary LaBine, Determinations of
Negligence and the Hindsight Bias, 20 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 501 (1996).
234 See 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) (2006) (denying patent protection to inventions that “would have
been obvious at the time the invention was made”).
235 See Gregory N. Mandel, Patently Non-Obvious: Empirical Demonstration that the Hindsight Bias Renders Patent Decisions Irrational, 67 OHIO ST. L.J. 1391, 1391 (2006).
236 Univ. of London Press, Ltd. v. Univ. Tutorial Press, Ltd., (1916) 2 Ch. 601, 610. While U.S.
copyright law has since moved away from this model, it is in many ways representative of the
general ex post structural framework on which copyright is premised.
237 See Rachlinski, supra note 232, at 571.
238 See id. at 573, 586–88.
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quence, it has been argued that the most effective way to deal with
hindsight bias involves acknowledging its presence in the process and
thereupon adapting the process based on this realization,239 but even
this approach cannot wholly eliminate the bias.
A large part of what contributes to hindsight bias in the use of
open-ended standards such as “reasonableness” or “foreseeability” generally is the absence of a specific point in time at which to anchor the
ex post reconstruction of the ex ante event or action. As a consequence, the presumptive ex ante world begins to assume features of
the ex post. One of the most common ways that courts attempt to control the influence of hindsight bias in ex post decisionmaking is
through the use of indicators for the determination that are fixed in
time. Professor Jeffrey Rachlinski thus notes that courts often develop
doctrinal mechanisms that attempt to anchor the determination to the
ex ante world — such as ex ante customary norms (for professional
negligence), or a long-felt ex ante need for a solution in an industry (in
patent law’s nonobviousness setting).240
In a similar vein, foreseeable copying would have the effect of connecting the infringement inquiry to the time at which the entitlement
is deemed to commence (as opposed to the time it is interfered with),
as a preliminary step. By emphasizing that a defendant’s copying is
actionable only if objectively foreseeable to the plaintiff at the time of
creation, and thereby forcing courts to acknowledge the importance of
the point of creation, it is likely to shift the focus of the inquiry away
from the present to the past. Additionally, the indicators for the test
that courts would come to use — deriving largely from their deployment of the foreseeability test in the licensing setting (for example, industry trends, the relevant state of the art, and so on) — would force
the inquiry to remain temporally anchored to the time of creation in
much the same way as other hindsight bias–controlling mechanisms
attempt to eliminate the influence of subsequent developments on the
process.
As with every ex post reconstruction that is clearly a “second-best
strateg[y],”241 the problem is not likely to be eliminated altogether. All
the same, compared to a world in which there exists no mechanism to
either recognize or control for the bias, a system tempered by a timespecific foreseeability limit is an obvious improvement.

–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
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VI. CONCLUSION
Central to much of the preceding argument is the idea that copyright law is not the best way of allocating windfalls associated with
unforeseeable uses. In numerous other contexts, the law uses foreseeability as a mechanism by which to avoid and reallocate these windfalls, in the belief that the costs and benefits associated with them are
incapable of inducing any significant ex ante behavioral modification
among individuals. Given the primacy of these behavioral assumptions across different areas of the common law, I have attempted to argue here that copyright law should be no different.
To the extent that copyright law continues to rely on a theory of incentives and the need to provide creators with an incentive to invest
time and resources into the creative process, it too attempts to bring
about ex ante behavioral modification among individuals. If the behavioral assumptions that the common law relies on in a host of other
areas are indeed true, then copyright law should find little reason to be
different. Individuals will not (and cannot) factor the unforeseeable
consequences of their actions into their ex ante reasons for acting.
Consequently, limiting copyright’s grant of exclusivity to uses of the
creative work that were foreseeable to a creator at the time of creation
is likely to better align creators’ creative decisionmaking with their incentives. The test of foreseeable copying proposed here would thus
provide copyright law with a device by which to doctrinally instantiate
its theory of incentives and simultaneously avoid misallocating the
windfalls that the current system produces. Using the basic idea that
individuals have limited predictive capabilities, especially in relation to
stochastic events, the foreseeable copying test remains premised on
providing creators with an incentive that is tailored to the exact way
in which the law presumes individuals to behave in a variety of other
contexts.
For far too long, copyright law and policy have centered around the
rhetoric of incentives and inducements but failed to integrate into doctrine the way in which they actually impact human behavior. It is
hoped that the present model will contribute to enabling the idea of
incentives to be more than just of rhetorical significance, or at the very
least, serve to wean copyright away from its reliance on an illusory
theory of creator incentives.

